Enemy spearhead has crossed the Danube at Dillingen. Road bridge not destroyed and in enemy hands. Immediate operation with Wasserballon intended after further clarification and confirmation.

Luftflotte 6 to OKL (22 April 1945)

Lw.Kdo. West is to destroy the Danube bridge at Dillingen, preferably at dawn on 23 April. Use all means to speed up forces’ readiness.

Luftflotte 6 to Luftwaffenkommando West (22 April 1945)

Enemy armoured spearheads north of Regensburg … the enemy advanced south toward Ingolstadt and Neuburg. At Dillingen he was able to form a bridgehead. The 19. Armee front east of the Rhine collapsed and has been breached at several points. Situation in Stuttgart area unclear. Reutligen taken by the enemy who was able to push forward as far as Sigmaringen and Ludwigshafen.

(Luftwaffe General Staff situation report)

While the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) was in the process of relocating from Wildpark-Werder to Berchtesgaden, the US 12th Armoured Division found the bridge over the Danube at Lauingen blown by the Germans but discovered the one at Dillingen, 5 km to the east, to be intact. The Americans rapidly established a bridgehead on the southern bank without, it appears, opposition from the Luftwaffe. The 7. Jagddivision’s effort had taken place early that morning and further to the West, along the Göppingen–Gammelshausen road. Sixteen Bf 109s of IV./JG 53 which had taken off at around 0530 GMT to bomb and strafe, setting two trucks on fire and claiming damage to several others (later upgraded to two destroyed and 10 damaged). The II./JG 53 was under orders to give up aircraft to the IV. Gruppe and 10 Bf 109s had set out at first light, one of them turning back and landing, presumably with some technical defect.

There are varying reports on reconnaissance that day. One says that four Bf 109s had been sent out on a reconnaissance of the Dillingen, Lauingen and Höchstädt bridges but by evening all four were still overdue; another that a single Bf 109 of 2./NAG 13 had been sent to Dillingen but broke off on encountering bad weather. Even so, a third document tabulated these observations from the day’s reconnaissance:

Under the pressure of American advances, 3./NAG 13 was ordered to transfer immediately from Cham (north east of Regensburg) to an alternative base about 145 km to the south west, in the Neubiberg area. Unable to comply, the Staffel blew up its last six Bf 109s the following morning, shortly before Cham was overrun.

Although at 1700 hours the 7. Jagd Div. had announced that no operations were scheduled overnight on account of the weather, the decision was reversed, perhaps when the seriousness of the position on the Danube was recognised and a report issued early next morning said that 10 ‘bombers’ had attacked the Dillingen bridge with six SD 500 bombs but had not observed the results. A later summary itemised this as:

three Ju 88s of V./NJG 2 dropping two SD 500 fragmentation bombs on the south bank right by the bridge;

two Ju 88s of the same unit bombing and strafing trucks and a goods train (two AB 500 anti-personnel canisters);

two Bf 110s of III./NJG 6 against enemy assemblies and traffic;

three Ju 88s of the same Gruppe dropping two SD 250 on the bridge at Gaildorf.

A Bf 110 and a Ju 88 had turned back with technical problems while another Ju 88 was missing and this last aircraft may have been either the Ju 88 or the ‘Do 217’ claimed by the 572nd AAA battalion defending Dillingen. A Nachtschlacht operation there and further afield had left two vehicles and a large train on fire; the cost had been one man killed as well as four men and one aircraft missing.

A string of messages passed from Lfl. 6 to Lw.Kdo. Nordost for onward transmission to Gefechtsverband Helbig concerning the Wasserballon bomb (all times converted to GMT):

Some Wasserballons were duly obtained because at 2330 orders went out to III./JG 53 and II./JG 300 to start as early as possible next morning to destroy the Dillingen bridge with ‘newly brought-up SD 250 with special fuses’. They were told that ‘special significance’ was attached to destruction of ‘the bridge which has already been damaged but is still usable’. Other elements of JG 53, JG 300, EJG 1 and KG 51 were to attack traffic crossing the river at Dillingen and on the road south from there to Holzheim. By employing all available forces, ‘a decisive effect’ was sought but if the weather was bad, operations should be flown in Schwarm strength. Both JG 53 and JG 300 were to have a Rotte at readiness from 0330 for weather reconnaissance.

Lorant and Goyat write (in their Battaille dans le Ciel d’Allemagne) that the 11 of II./JG 300’s pilots who still had aircraft had been briefed for the operation at Lfl. 6’s Neubiberg-bei-München HQ during the evening, and that KG 51’s Technical Officer had been brought over from Prague to supervise the weapons’ installation. However, this last point seems doubtful in view of the previous afternoon’s orders that Stab KG 51 should transfer to the Rosenheim area and the I. Gruppe to Memmingen. Furthermore, unless this officer was offering personal expertise, it is difficult to how KG 51 and its Me 262s might have been involved with Wasserballon which could not be dropped from above 250 m nor at a speed in excess of 400 km/h. That the bombs had been delivered to Neubiberg from Prague is documented however and they were due to be accompanied by an Uffz. Merk and the two Oberleutnants mentioned above.

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