The Gruppe lost a Ju 87 D-5 (W.Nr. 130091) on a 1 March sortie to the Göritz area, with its crew, Ofw. Hans Rattensteiner (pilot) and Uffz. Ludwig Rehmer (wireless operator), both posted missing. The Göritz bridghead was once more the objective for 19 Ju 87s and a Ju 88 illuminator on the night of the 2nd/3rd and bombs were said to have been accurately placed on vehicle columns east of the Oder. The weapons expended point to each Ju 87 carrying an SD 250 on its fuselage rack and four SD 70s under its wings while the Ju 88 was loaded with two SD 500s and seven LC 50 flares. Three Ju 87s were reported lost, details of two appearing in the Quartermaster General’s loss lists:

On 4 March Lfl. 6 warned that the fuel situation meant limiting the commitment of flying units to what was absolutely necessary on the battlefronts. Elements of NSGr. 8 were reported that day to be distributed between Neuruppin, Werder and Rangsdorf. Two days later OKL advised that III./SG 2’s conversion from the Ju 87 to the Fw 190 (see above) had been put back to April, again for lack of fuel. Alternative airfields for II. Fliegerkorps’ units were identified should there be ‘an unfavourable development of the ground situation in the great battle of the Oder and Berlin’. For NSGr. 8 this would entail its division between Neuruppin, Gatow and Rangsdorf, with B4 fuel provided at each base. Another measure announced on the 4th was that from noon next day 1./NSGr. 4 would be subordinated in all respects to ‘4. Fliegerdivision (NSG 8)’ though in practice it seems to have continued operating separately. Four days later, The Gruppe’s location was listed as Werneuchen with the attached 1./NSGr. 4 en route to Anklam.

Orders went out from the General Staff to Lfl. 6 on 11March that a Schwarm of Nachtschlacht Ju 87s from II. Fl.Kps. were to be transferred to Brüsterort on the Baltic. Led by an officer and with support from senior mechanics, they were were to be subordinate to Lw.Kdo. Ostpreußen in all respects for the duration of operations there. At the same time the tactical command Gefechtsverband Weiß was moving 2./SG 3 from Brüsterort to Hexengrund. It was only on the 19th that a Ltn. Heinemann signalled to Brüsterort from NSGr. 8’s command post at Werneuchen, asking for a report on the landing of four Ju 87s. A report of operations on the 20th states that two Ju 87s of »Einsatz Schwarm NSG 8« had bombed traffic columns at Freudenthal and Rehfeld (on the Zinten - Heiligenbeil road) with two AB 250 canisters and eight SD 70 bombs but a third machine had been turned back by bad weather. A telegram of the 24th included a Schwarm from 3./NSGr. 8 among 200 aircraft occupying Brüsterort and a day later, Nachtschlachtschwarm 3./NSGr. 8 was listed among the units subordinated to Lw.Kdo. Ostpreußen. Throughout April NSGr. 8’s strength figures are annotated as ‘(less 1. Schw.)’.

Back on the Oder, two of the Gruppe’s Ju 87s attacked troops and vehicles massed in the Göritz bridgehead with six AB 250 canisters on the night of the 20th/21st. A sign of the times was the unit’s reported strength on the latter date: 39 (38) Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 plus 3 (0) Go 145; many Luftwaffe formations were now being issued with older variants of their normal aircraft or with less-capable types (especially if the latter made fewer demands on fuel).

Back on the Oder, two of the Gruppe’s Ju 87s attacked troops and vehicles massed in the Göritz bridgehead with six AB 250 canisters on the night of the 20th/21st. A sign of the times was the unit’s reported strength on the latter date: 39 (38) Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 plus 3 (0) Go 145; many Luftwaffe formations were now being issued with older variants of their normal aircraft or with less-capable types (especially if the latter made fewer demands on fuel).

Order for the support of the offensive operation on the Oder near Frankfurt. Flying units to be committed … all Nachtschlacht forces of II. Flg.Korps, 1./NSGr. 4 included.

HQ Luftflotte 6 (20 March 1945)

Göritz was yet again the target on the 22nd/23rd, along with bombing and strafing of traffic in the Küstrin and Kalenzig areas, and the total effort comprised 48 Ju 87 sorties supported by a Ju 88 and a Ju 188. One bomb struck close to the northern bridge at Göritz while in a low-level attack on an air strip an Il-2 was shot down in flames as it was landing. The cost to the Luftwaffe was one Ju 87 brought down by Flak (the crew were able to bail out) and three more damaged when landing. Bombs and canisters expended comprised 18 x AB 500, 4 x SC 400, 105 x AB 250 and 83 x SD 70. Two losses were recorded by the Quartermaster General, on the 22nd and 23rd respectively. Both aircraft crashed on friendly territory after being hit by enemy fire and both crews bailed out unhurt:

There were two operations on the following night: 18 Ju 87s, a Ju 88 and a Ju 188 attacked ‘enemy targets’ and traffic in the area of Rathstock; and 14 Ju 87s raided various targets in the Göritz-Rathstock-Kalenzig bridgehead. One of the Ju 87s crashed near Strausberg for unknown reasons but its crew bailed out safely while another was damaged by a single bomb dropped on Werneuchen. An entry in the Lfl. 6’s diary for the 24th notes that:

Night: Bomber and Nachtschlacht aircraft attacked to Oder bridge at Neu-Rathstock and the Kalenzig bridge. One hit on the western section of the former, attacks on the latter without observed effect. In addition, enemy targets in the area of Rathstock, the bridghead at Görtiz-Kalenzig and the areas of Steinau and Bielitz were attacked. Numerous fires and explosions observed.

A reinforcement of II. Fliegerkorps’ Nachtschlacht forces had been announced on the 23rd, with the Ar 66-equippped 4./NSGr. 5 being transferred from Luftflotte 4 to Neuhardenberg. As far as possible the aircraft complement was to come from reserves in Lfl. 4’s rear areas rather than those on operations at the front and the newcomers would appear in the Lfl. 6 strength return for 3 April with 9 (7) Ar 66 and 9 (9) Go 145.

Lebus was the Gruppe’s objective on 25 March, eliciting the following reaction from 712. Infantry Division:

Enemy preparation areas were heavily assailed by bombs and artillery. From bombing: major fires in the centre of Lebus, probably fuel, an ammunition dump destroyed. Losses in personnel still unconfirmed. Planned [Soviet] attack (at 0615 hrs according to radio monitoring) not carried out. The bombs were well placed, above all in Lebus West and North but not in the rest of the town.

On the 27th, the Küstrin Fortress signalled that, ‘Our own Shlachtflieger operations were well on target and brought appreciable relief’.

Summing up his Gruppe’s experiences during March, Maj. Johann Trnka reported having operated on seven nights for a total of 178 Ju 87 sorties, six by Ju 188s, four by Ju 88s and two by Go 145s but which unit the multi-engined types belonged to was not stated. Attacks had been made on troop preparation areas, artillery emplacements and assemblies of motor vehicles in the areas of Gorgast, Manschnow, Neu-Manschnow (all west of the Oder, opposite Küstrin), Reitwein, Göritz and Lebus as well as against the supply routes round the Oder crossings near Rathstock and Göritz. When the weather was good operations were supported by Ju 88s for illumination and target-marking. In every case crews claimed to have recognised their exact targets and placed bombs on them accurately, invoking the customary formula that ‘major losses of enemy personnel and materiel can be counted on’. In all during March the Gruppe had dropped:

Canisters: 61 x AB 500, 143 x AB 250-SD 10, 262 x AB 250-SD 1, 2 x AB 70

Bombs: 50 x SD 70, 19 x SD 250, 6 x SC 500

Markers: 1 x red marker 500, 5 x green marker 500, 4 x green marker 250

Flares: 37 x LC 50

During moonlit operations there had been isolated but unconfirmed reports of enemy night fighters; Soviet anti-aircraft gunners appeared to have been using non-tracer ammunition but no hostile searchlight activity had been observed near the front. Concentrated attacks in Staffel strength (about 15 aircraft) supported by Ju 88 illuminators were felt to have proved very effective; illumination and target-marking had enabled crews to orientate themselves with precision and to attack under the most favourable circumstances. Using this technique, crews were able to run in in the quickest possible succession and in most instances the formation leader could monitor the results of the bombing. When visibility was under 5 km, even if skies were cloudless, operations offered scant reward as the problems of flying and orientation in such conditions did not allow ‘a flawless attack and dive’. When attacking in the immediate vicinity of the front it was of great importance that friendly troops identify themselves by firing white recognition signals toward the front line. To locate the most important targets it was advantageous if the Army fired aiming shots with tracer rounds.

For its part, NSGr. 8’s parent formation, 4. Fl.Div., credited the Gruppe with 199 sorties in March, in the course of which 27.75 tonnes of ‘full bombs’ and 129.64 t of AB canisters had been dropped. Material losses had been two aircraft lost, two missing and four damaged in crashes or emergency landings while one hostile plane was claimed shot down (the Il-2 on the 22nd/23rd, see above). The Division’s principal targets had been the Oder bridges where there had been an noticeable increase in the Flak defences but the Luftwaffe’s attacks had brought appreciable relief to friendly ground forces

On the 29th the Gruppe was at Werneuchen and ended the month with a strength of 23 (29) Ju 87 D-3 and D-5; 5 (2) Go 145 and 2 (2) Ar 66.

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