The Gruppe was in Fürstenwalde by 16 February and had gone on to Werneuchen by the 20th, subordinated to II. Fliegerkorps. The following evening it recorded a strength 28 (18) Ju 87 D-5 but this had risen to 38 (20) by the 23rd. Since the number of operational crews went up from 14 to 34 over the same period it is possible that some of them had been away fetching aircraft. This however came at a time when the General der Schlachtflieger (Gen.d.S.) was advising that Nachtschlacht-configured Ju 87 D-3s and D-5s were no longer available and as stocks ran down the plan was to re-equip NSGr. 4 and NSGr. 8 with Siebel 204s which would each require 1,200 man-hours to convert them to the night attack role. Because these would not become available until Mid-March, ‘to fully utilise the capacity of the Nachtschlacht formations’ NSGr. 8 would receive the Ar 66 and Go 145 which were available immediately, ready-converted. Meanwhile, Lfl. 6 was hoping to pull III./SG 2 out of the line and convert it from the Ju 87 to the Fw 190 ‘as soon as the major fighting on the Eastern Front shows signs of dying down’ because in the prevailing situation the Ju 87 offered only ‘limited operational possibilities’.

A telegram from 1. Jagddivision in the early hours of 2 February reported that ‘I./NSG 8’ had contributed 17 Ju 87 sorties to the previous day’s operations without suffering any crew or aircraft casualties. The 4. Fliegerdiv. to which NSGr. 8 was subordinated was assigned the following tasks as of midnight:

… to impede with all means the enemy thrust toward Berlin and to create the conditions for a successful defensive battle by the Army by destroying enemy tanks and supply vehicles. Alongside this, part forces are to engage the enemy thrust from Schneidemühl toward NW of Stettin (superimposed on 1. Flg.Div.). Immediate smashing of all enemy attempts at crossing the Oder have precedence in the entire zone of 4. Flg.Div., especially east of Berlin.

Debate over the Ju 87’s future continued on the 3rd with warnings that ‘units equipped with slow, weakly-defended aircraft (Ju 87)’ were especially vulnerable to incursions by the Western Allies and when their base areas were threatened, airfields must become inactive, with all planes dispersed until the all-clear sounded. Meanwhile Gen.d.S. was calling for the immediate cessation of daylight operations by the Ju 87 D-3s and 5s provided to Gefechtsverband Rudel. These aircraft had been converted for Nachtschlacht operations at a cost of 1000 man-hours apiece and were instead to go to NSGr. 8. Replacements for them had already taken off from Faßberg but a handwritten annotation suggests that the weather might be delaying these. Luftflotte 6 noted that since 18 January its units had received 10 Ju 87s for daylight operations and just six for the night attack role.

Even so, NSGr. 8’s recorded strengths at this period are erratic: 14 (9) Ju 87 D-5s and 12 crews on 7 February; 17 (15) and 16 crews on the 10th; 24 (17) and 37 crews only a day later. A telephone conversation on the 12th confirmed that Gen.d.S. was ferrying his last 11 daylight Ju 87 Ds to III./SG 2, leaving him only Nachtschlacht models. So, ‘for the preservation of Nachtschlacht units in the zone of Lfl.Kdo. 6, 20 aircraft [would] be allocated’. This was partially contradicted after just four days with news from Gen.d.S. that the conversion of Ju 87s to the Nachtschlacht role had been suspended ‘on account of various incidents’ and that any machines emerging were needed to make good ‘severe deficiencies in the West’. Accordingly, the only way to get NSGr. 8 up to strength was transfer the 10–15 Nachtschlacht D-5s which had been allocated to Gefechtsverband Rudel but were now with III./SG 2. An ambiguous telegram of 17 February returns to this issue, apparently proposing that these aircraft (awaiting conversion in Halle-Nietleben and Kölleda) should indeed go to NSGr. 8 while 15 D-1s and D-3s originally intended for III./SG 2 should also be converted to Nachtschlacht configuration in Nietleben (where there were 9 (1) Ju 87 D-5s in reserve on 20 February).

The II. Flg.Kps. was still worrying about the overcrowding of its airfields; there was insufficient fuel to fly or even to tow away all the non-operational aircraft, proper dispersal could not be achieved and major losses must be expected from any attack. In the Korps’ area only Strausberg (occupied by JG 11) had adequate Flak protection against strafers.

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