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The Allies had now amassed enough intelligence to deduce that Kommando Suchy was operating under Fliegerdivision, 2 alongside 1.(F)/33 and confirmation came on 11 June in a signal to “Kdo. Ltn. Such [sic], Saint Martin” [Saint-Martin-de- Crau, 1.(F)/33’s base]. The sender wanted to know why there had been no operation even though the aircraft were serviceable and Suchy was at the base. The detachment was directed that to achieve satisfactory Funkmeßaufklärung only one or two sets should be used for locating radar transmitters. Furthermore, the operation was only useful when it was proved beyond doubt that the “apparatus” was on land or sea. It seems from the context that the Kommando was searching for radar, rather than searching with it and was perhaps engaged in mapping or interfering with Allied coverage in the Mediterranean.

The Kommando reported to Cormeilles on the 22nd that Z6+AL needed alterations to an aerial while Z6+DL was undergoing changes to its Neptun (fitted to a Ju 88, this was almost certainly the tail-warning version of the FuG 216 radar). On the afternoon of the 26th, more information emerged: the crews were operational, as was Z6+AL but Z6+DL was to transfer to Cormeilles: it set off at 02.00 [GMT+2] on the 28th. Meanwhile, a British intelligence report for the 24 hours from dawn on the 27th noted how: “High altitude reconnaissance was attempted by 6.(F)/123 from St. Martin. One Ju 188 was airborne [at] 0410 [GMT+2] but broke off with one engine u/s”; this was despite Z6+AL’s engine change on the 26th.

6.(F)/123’s strength, 26 June 1944




Ju 88 S-1

W.Nr. 140607


Ju 188

W.Nr. 140700

(special fitting Reims)

Ju 188 E-1

W.Nr. 260153


Ju 188 F-1

W.Nr. 281613


Do 217 E-4

W.Nr. 1117

(shot up, being repaired at Beauvais)


Fw. Schulte (fully ready); Fw. Paetz (fully ready); Fw. Hauck (detached); Fw. Schieck (detached); Uffz. Seifert (detached); Uffz. Polzin (detached).

July 1944

The 5th of July brought rare evidence of an operation by 6.(F)/123 when aircraft NQ+VR was to take off from Cormeilles at 20.30 GMT, make an intermediate landing at Rennes for refuelling and fly to a point about 300 km SW of Penzance before returning to base.

NOTE: As early as April 1940 the Stammkennzeichen NQ+ had been associated with the Köthen Signals Establishment’s aircraft.

Suchy’s detachment remained in being, reporting on the 6th that the one machine it had left was now having its starboard engine changed. Five days later, a signal went out from FAG 123, apparently to the 6. Staffel: serviceable aircraft were to be ferried that day, with the exception of (one or more?) He 111, “as agreed”. Any special equipment that could not be carried onboard was to be conveyed by land. By 10 July the decision had been taken that 4./FAGr. 5 should be disbanded, its personnel and equipment being absorbed by 6.(F)/123. Although three aircraft were reported as being handed over to their new owner, only one (Ju 188 F-1, W.Nr. 260251, 9V+EM) appeared in its strength returns, perhaps because it had been in Germany the whole time.

A proposal of the 11th for a “supplementary deployment of a Lichtenstein aircraft on a radio-reconnaissance flight by 6.(F)/123 to the Balearics” was approved by Funkhorch-Regiment West the next day: a possible target of Mediterranean monitoring flights featured in a paper of the 12th. The III./Ln. Rgt. 2 claimed to have established that a 171.5 mHz set with a 600 Hz pulse repetition frequency had been installed on fishing boats operating in Luftlotte 2’s area. The matter was supposedly beyond doubt as the gear had actually been seen on this type of vessel by a U-boat which had surfaced and lain alongside. This was seen as proving that small boats carrying radar were operating by day, using fishing fleets fas cover (there had been similar concerns in Biscay in the last quarter of 1943). Also taken as confirmed was the presence of homing transmitters to facilitate rendezvous with agents and saboteurs and listening stations were to be alerted to this new development. Suchy’s Kommando may have been wound up soon afterward for there is no further mention of it in 6.(F)/123’s returns.

Following a period of training with I./FAG 101 in Großenhain, Fw. Werner Busch joined 6.(F)/123 in Cormeilles, flying his first operation on the night of 13/14 July from 22.43–00.05 hrs. (GMT+2) in Ju 88 S-1 Z6+DL (W.Nr. 140607). He recorded this as Einsatz. H-Aufklärung (= “Operation. H-reconnaissance”) which probably meant Horch- or listening.

NOTE: It is possible that he wrote X-Aufklärung since an uppercase X in the Sütterlin script of the era resembles a rather florid H. I have opted for H based on a crewman’s surname beginning with the same character: “Heesen” is widespread in Western Germany and the Netherlands while “Xeesen” is absent. Also, Marcel van Heijkop advises that Ltn. Hans Altrogge logged Horcheinsätze during his brief service with 3./KG 66.

The following night’s flight began at almost the same time and Z6+DL’s landing gear was damaged. On the night of the 17/18th, a night fighter forced Busch (in Ju 88 A-4, Z6+JL) to divert to Dôle-Tavaux, about 340 km SE of Cormeilles. When he flew again on the 25/26th, (in Ju 88 D-5, Z6+HL) failure of the H-Geräte (monitoring sets) meant that only part of the mission was carried out. On 26/27 July, Busch landed the same machine in Soesterberg and after just short of two hours on the ground flew a sortie from there, landing at 04.58. He took off again for Cormeilles 75 minutes later, only to find four “English low-flyers” over his destination.

Like so many other commanders, Staffelkapitän, Hptm. Heinz De Wilde was quick to reassure FAGr. 123’s National Socialist Leadership Officer of his unit’s loyalty in the wake of the failed 20 July Plot against Hitler, reporting:

1) Staffel morale good, indignation at the murderous attack.

2) Personnel newly allotted from the homeland during the last few days is being watched.

3) At 100/21/7 [GMT] instruction was given by Staffelkapitän.

On the 30th, Luftflotte 3 recorded that "security, battle and radar reconnaissance was flown", July's sole mention of any Funkmeßaufklärung.

NOTE: De Wilde’s name cropped up again in an intercepted message in January 1945. Consisting largely of covernames, the signal dealt with the availablility of a “heavy Flak mounting 104”.

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