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An operation codenamed »Ludwig« was the subject of signals starting on 14 August when it was mentioned in Fliegerkorps IV’s orders for the day with a probable zero-hour of 1600. By noon however, Fl.Kps. V was telling ZG 2 that it had been cancelled and Bletchley Park suggested, based on reconnaissance tasks assigned to 3.(F)/31, that the target might be somewhere between Start Point in Devon and Poole, Dorset. Two days later, »Ludwig« was was again expected to take place, this time at 1500 and involving JG 2, JG 54 and ZG 2 with 4.(F)/121 providing weather reconnaissance.

During the evening of 14 August, Fliegerkorps V issued Order No. 109, covering operations for the next day. KG 55 was to dispatch two waves of Ketten and single aircraft against the Rolls Royce works in Crewe and the aerodromes of Upper Heyford, Kidlington, Brize Norton and Netheravon. The second wave was to be over its targets by 1000 and general execution should follow Order No. 107 for the 14th (which Bletchley had not intercepted). There was to be a meteorological flight as early as possible, “course at first to be in wide zigzags”. Weather permitting, Fliegerkorps IV should repeat its second attack of the first day (presumably »Adlertag«), probably crossing the English coast at 1230 with JG 2 and ZG 2 directly controlled by Jafü 3 for this operation. KG 51, KG 54 and 4.(F)/121 were to rest and verbal orders would be given to 4.(F)/14. This signal was read sometime between 1600 and 2100 on the 15th, after all the raids ordered should have been over but none of the targets is mentioned in Luftwaffe’s daily situation report. ULTRA suggests that if initially there was a menu of plans to choose from, operations from it might be repeated, rescheduled or called off altogether. On 14 August, for example, »2 Frühstück« was due to be repeated, then followed by »5 Frühstück«

Radio monitoring during the »Adlertag« fighting had noted “a renewal of heavy wireless traffic from Warmwell” and ULTRA uncovered repeated plans to attack it, the Luftwaffe apparently being unaware that it was only a satellite airfield in the Middle Wallop sector. In a signal which had been read by 0705 on 20 August, two Gruppen of KG 51 were told be be at readiness from 0700 for an attack Target 10250 (correctly identified by Bletchley as Warmwell) at an unspecified time that day. Escort was to be provided by JG 2, JG 27 and JG 53 KG 53 was to rest that day, pending operations overnight and KG 54 was to hold 12 aircraft ready for harassment sorties should the Warmwell operation be called off. In the event, the attack was rescheduled for the next day, with the two KG 51 Gruppen again at readiness from 0700. Instructions were renewed yet again for 22, 23 and 24 August. These cancelled attacks were, ironically, all the subject of timely warnings:

The raid finally happened on the 25th and the intercepted orders from Fliegerkorps V (read in England by 0700) went into some detail:

For the attack on Warmwell, Jafü 3 was to allocate “all forces previously arranged for in conversation” and orders for a second operation would follow. Under the Jafü’s orders, two Do 17s from 4.(F)/14 were to lay smoke lanes over the Channel from Cherbourg-East. The 4.(F)/121 was to fly weather reconnaissance in Squares 211, 212, 314 and 111 as early as possible. In addition it was to send one machine to cover aerodromes in the Brighton – Aldershot – Southampton area.

Deciphered the day it was sent, a message of 1 September ordered aerodromes prepared and supplied “in all haste”, each for four operations by a bomber Gruppe. Maldegem and Wevelgem would each receive a Gruppe of KG 26 and 24 x SC 100 bombs and while Chièvres and Melsbroeck would each house a KG 30 Gruppe and 48 x SC 1000. Luftflotte 2 had indented for further supplies of these very heavy bombs and LWC 2000 bomb-trolleys. This depletion of forces in Scandinavia and Northern Germany further reduced the threat of major raids on Scotland and Eastern England and indicated a desire to reinforce or replenish the bomber strength committed to the cross-Channel offensive.

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