Just a day after »Adlertag«, JG 2’s Kommodore, Obstltn. Harry von Bülow-Bothkamp told the fighter replacement group at Merseburg that he could not fetch the pilots assigned to his unit so they must travel to Beaumont-le-Roger by rail. He urged that only particularly well-trained men be sent, “to avoid losses in personnel and material”. In response, orders were given to provide 15 pilots who were “both efficient and temperamentally suitable”. In the last week of August Ob.d.L. corresponded with one of the Luftflotten about a scheme for retraining reconnaissance pilots as fighters, saying that the size of the pupil intake had not yet been fixed but the Luftflotte’s proposal for its own programme should be submitted to Ob.d.L. for approval. On the 29th, seven Zerstörer crews were being sent from Ergänzungszerstörergruppe Vaerløse to ZG 76 at Dinard. A week after that, five new crews in Calais were going on to Rocquancourt for training, apparently with V.(Z)/LG 1. On 7 September I. /KG 30 wanted the other two Gruppen to send it aircraft and the training of some crews awaited completion.

The same day, III./JG 2 had urged the replacement of a civilian official, Regierungsinspektor Herbert Godemann by someone more competent and experienced, “in view of the exceptional demands being made on fighter squadrons at the present time”. On 23 August JG 2 appealed to Fliegerkorps V to reconsider the transfer of Hptm. Kohl to Jafü 3. He had done good work on the staff of the II. Gruppe with “heavy losses of officers in recent days” making him all the more indispensable. Further, “the few available flying officers” were needed to train newly-drafted pilots. Six days later and just over two weeks into the “intensified air war against England”, JG 54 was assigned 15 pilots from Merseburg with the stipulation that “they must be ready to fight at once”. Another seven pilots were en route to JG 2 on 5 September. Meanwhile efforts were being made to have Reg.Insp. Sandhof posted as II./KG 54’s Supplies Officer, to supplement the one other official available. The same message disclosed that V. Fliegerkorps’ HQ was in the rue St. Georges, Cambrai.

Availability of sea rescue aircraft seems to have been a worry. Seenotzentrale Boulogne on 18 August complained that after the “partial removal” of 3./Küstenfliegergruppe 406 only two Do 18, K6+GL and K6+KL were operational. The same day however, Od.d.L. had refused permission to Fl.Kps IV to use a captured Potez in the sea rescue role. KG 40 on 25 August was still trying to organise the move of KGr. 126 from Oldenburg to Brest-Süd but was hampered by “a great shortage of motor vehicles”. On 11 September the Geschwader received a telegram from a Ltn. Lindner saying that nothing was known “here” about Obltn. Plümecke and a KGr. 126 advance party, how long were they supposed to have been in Brest? The response was that they had left Oldenburg that afternoon. A lack of accommodation was hindering the deployment of Luftwaffe units to Western France: while KG 40 and KGr. 126 could now move to Brest right away, Nantes on 29 August was only available as a jumping-off point as there were difficulties with quarters for Küstenfliegergruppe 806.

Aircraft could prove unreliable: on 15 August the Rechlin experimental station published a paper on the tendency of Ju 88 engines to cut out during take-off or landing due to insufficient fuel pressure. On the 20th Luftflotte 2 reiterated advice that if an engine failed, the Bf 110 must be belly-landed. Complaints from units about their aircraft seem to have been rare but Aufkl.Gr. (H) 41on 14 August renewed a request for three Do 17 B (sic) so that it could undertake longer coastal patrols and reconnaissances out to sea, pointing out that its request of 27 July had been completely ignored.

In V. Fliegerkorps the most basic flight safety standards were slipping, to judge from a complaint about “great carelessness” on the part of the Rennes station command one night toward the end of August. Negligence in setting out landing crosses had seen two He 111 coming in simultaneously on opposing courses. A collision had only narrowly been avoided and Göring had ordered that in future such cases should go before a court martial. An unusual complaint arose in Luftgau Westfrankreich around the same time: LG Nachr. Rgt. 12 operators sending morse at “far too high a speed” were warned not to exceed the regulation 50 letters per minute. On the 29th one signaller mentioned the installation of heating in his unit’s billets. His opposite number—apparently confident of imminent victory—was taken aback that anyone was expecting to spend the winter in France, “We … intend to be back home by the time the cold begins”.

Oberleutnant Noack’s signals Ju 52 took off early on 28 August for Bois Jean-Écuires; on arrival he was to telephone ZG 2’s Signals Officer at Berck (about 12 km to the West). Two days later however, Noack fell foul of a Hptm. Simon in whose view the Ju 52 was supposed to have operated on the night of 29/30 August but Noack and his men had been asleep. Faced with complaints next day Noack asked who had ordered any night working but Simon told him he must be ready to operate round the clock.

JG 2 was reprimanded on 5 September for its “repeated failure or refusal” to submit daily loss and accident returns. No report had been made of losses on the 2nd despite indents for replacement aircraft. The X. Fliegerkorps next day felt obliged to remind its units that strength and readiness returns for individual crews must be submitted promptly. In a more positive vein, Göring two days later directed Aerodrome Regions Commanders personally to thank the men of the Reichsarbeitsdienst (Labour Service) for their efforts in building up the Luftwaffe’s ground organisation “in the battle against England”. Orders were passed to St. Dizier on 14 September that until further notice “the last ounce of effort must be got from all technical services” and that the relevant personnel must only be granted leave in the most urgent cases. An order was also issued by Luftflotte 3 that leave for all ground personnel was forbidden for the duration of the “great attack on England” with exceptions only for cases of death or unavoidable circumstances. Next day Luftflotte 2 advised Fliegerkorps VIII that losses and changes among Technical Officers were undermining units’ operational efficiency and so these men should only fly over enemy territory in special cases. In addition, each should have a deputy ready to assume his duties immediately. The same day, Göring reiterated orders that any crimes against Luftwaffe property of personnel by the population of the occupied territories were to be tried by Luftwaffe tribunals and not the Army’s.

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