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continued…

The MG FFM cannon generated a fair amount of correspondence. Le Havre-Octeville (base of III./JG 2) was told on 13 August that it could fetch 2 cm FFM and FF 115 gram shells which had now arrived at the depot at Maintenon. On the 24th, JG 2 was warned that M-ammunition (thin-walled and designed to inflict blast damage) must only be loaded in a ratio of 1:4 and that to use more was forbidden. This admonition followed by what Luftgau Belgien-Nordfrankreich two days later was calling “a temporary crisis” in the supply of FFM ammunition for moveable guns. Airfields were told only to request what they actually needed and that the shells must not be used in fixed cannon; further, 90 gram shells must only be mixed with 115 gram HE and practice ammunition. On the 26th, V. Fliegerkorps passed on to JG 2 and ZG 2 Luftflotte 3’s complaint that 10-day expenditure returns of MG FF ammunition were out of all proportion to the amounts supplied to Jagd- and Zerstörergeschwader. Both units were therefore to submit reports of their stocks. Next day Luftgaustab z.b.V. 16 urgently requested 15,000 rounds of 2 cm FFM, saying that Zerstörer were unable to operate owing to shortage of ammunition.

On 30 August ZG 76 was told to remove the two compressed-air cylinders from the cannon of a Bf 110 at Dinard and send them to Ligescourt; four days after that, ZG 76’s Kommodore asked V.(Z)/LG 1 to provide “cabin roof, undercarriage switch, and two cylinders of compressed air for MGSS HG4” right away and it is likely that “MGSS” was a typographical error for MG FF. The next issue with the cannon centred on »Vorholfedern« (recuperator springs) which would available in Luftflotten 2 and 3 on 11 September but initially only in cases of urgent need. The same day, II./ZG 2 was told to check whether its guns had the type M40 recuperator springs: with a life of only 80–120 shots these were unusable and must be changed. JG 2 had evidently been told the same because its I. Gruppe needed 110 sets for its MG FFM and the II. Gruppe required 60. There had been correspondence with the same Gruppe on 18 August about the supply of »Flugzeugvernichter«, presumably aircraft self-destruction charges.

At the end of July, messages began to be sent about a new weapon, the SBo or »Seilbombe« (cable bomb) though some of them were not read by the British for another month. On 29 July, V. Fl.Kps. directed KG 54 that one of its Gruppen should make preparations for installing the weapon, which was designed for the destruction of high-tension power lines. The unit was to send one crew and an NCO bomb-aimer to Rechlin right away, for a two-day course. Actual operations would not take place until special orders were given. The RLM Technisches Amt (Technical Bureau) then informed Luftflotte 3’s Chief Engineer that an installation team and equipment would be arriving in Coulommiers on 2 August with a view to putting the SBo into action. On 4 August a KG 54 engineer named Koch notified the RLM that four fitters had arrived in Évreux two days before and that “work in connection with SBo operations” had begun but asked when further SBo carriers had been dispatched from “MWG” (the firm of Mechanische Werkstätten Neubrandenburg G.m.b.H.). On 13 August, Stabsingenieure (Staff Engineers) Steinmann and Vollhardt and Ministerialrat (Assistant Secretary) Freise were discussing the SBo with St.G 77 at Maltot in Normandy, the base of that Geschwader’s I. Gruppe and on the 29th the Technisches Amt informed Luftflotte 2’s Chief Engineer in Brussels that the manufacturer had dispatched “SBo 53” to the equipment depot at Gosselies, near Charleroi.

On 16 August, V. Fl.Kps. briefed its subordinate units on a new incendiary weapon, the 250 kg »Flam C2-250«; this could be dropped from any altitude that allowed enough time for the fuse to arm. First experience with the bomb was said to have been very satisfactory.

The 31st of the month saw an Obltn. Oelmann asking that Reims be supplied with as many cement practice bombs as possible. Supplies of lorry tyres seem to have been erratic: ten days earlier 1./Aufklärungsgruppe Ob.d.L. had received all it requested, on the 30th Luftgau Nachrichten Regiment 12 was told that its order could not be fulfilled.At the end of July, messages began to be sent about a new weapon, the SBo or »Seilbombe« (cable bomb) though some of them were not read by the British for another month. On 29 July, V. Fl.Kps. directed KG 54 that one of its Gruppen should make preparations for installing the weapon, which was designed for the destruction of high-tension power lines. The unit was to send one crew and an NCO bomb-aimer to Rechlin right away, for a two-day course. Actual operations would not take place until special orders were given. The RLM Technisches Amt (Technical Bureau) then informed Luftflotte 3’s Chief Engineer that an installation team and equipment would be arriving in Coulommiers on 2 August with a view to putting the SBo into action. On 4 August a KG 54 engineer named Koch notified the RLM that four fitters had arrived in Évreux two days before and that “work in connection with SBo operations” had begun but asked when further SBo carriers had been dispatched from “MWG” (the firm of Mechanische Werkstätten Neubrandenburg G.m.b.H.). On 13 August, Stabsingenieure (Staff Engineers) Steinmann and Vollhardt and Ministerialrat (Assistant Secretary) Freise were discussing the SBo with St.G 77 at Maltot in Normandy, the base of that Geschwader’s I. Gruppe and on the 29th the Technisches Amt informed Luftflotte 2’s Chief Engineer in Brussels that the manufacturer had dispatched “SBo 53” to the equipment depot at Gosselies, near Charleroi.

On 16 August, V. Fl.Kps. briefed its subordinate units on a new incendiary weapon, the 250 kg »Flam C2-250«; this could be dropped from any altitude that allowed enough time for the fuse to arm. First experience with the bomb was said to have been very satisfactory.

The 31st of the month saw an Obltn. Oelmann asking that Reims be supplied with as many cement practice bombs as possible. Supplies of lorry tyres seem to have been erratic: ten days earlier 1./Aufklärungsgruppe Ob.d.L. had received all it requested, on the 30th Luftgau Nachrichten Regiment 12 was told that its order could not be fulfilled.

continued on next page …

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CONTENTS

Introduction

Equipment

Strain

Insecurity

Infrastructure

Intelligence

Operations and Plans

Food and Drink

Naval Intelligence

Invasion

Claims

Awards

Sources

© Nick Beale 2022


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