The RAF had at first tried to counter this threat with Operation SHORT CIRCUIT. The main Ju 87 and Fw 190 bases had been identified and those within the cover of No. 85 Group's forward ground controlled interception (GCI) stations had each had been given a code number. A Mosquito with a specially trained crew was to be held at readiness or if necessary diverted from a normal patrol. When Nachtschlacht activity was detected, the fighter was to be directed to the designated airfield at a level as low as maintenance of friendly radar contact would permit. When the controller was satisfied that the Mosquito was suitably placed, he was to give the code word "SHORT CIRCUIT". The aircraft would then descend and act as an intruder, engaging "any single engined or clearly recognisable hostile aircraft". It does not look as if this technique was persisted with for long and a great many of Hallensleben's losses seem to have ocurred in the target areas.

Fighter attacks were not invariably fatal but nor was low altitude any sure protection. In the early hours of 4 February, a P-61 of the 422nd Night Fighter Squadron, 9th AF destroyed Ju 87 D-5 WNr. 142107 of Stab/NSG 1, east of Jülich. It seems to have been this German crew's report (both men escaped unhurt) that was subsequently deciphered by the Allies:

Over Lich ... a Black Widow attacked from below at 800 m. Not known whether oblique armament used. The Black Widow followed all defensive movements, keeping within visual range, and again opened fire at 200 m. German aircraft caught fire.

At 18.35 on the 21st, flying at 200m between Rheydt and Neuss, a Ju 87 crewman heard a ticking sound in his intercom shortly before being attacked by a "twin-engined shadow" and sighting a few tracers. Twenty-five minutes later, another attack came without the warning noise (which German airmen believed was caused by night fighters' radar transmissions) and this time at just 100m altitude. It seems the Junkers in question was from 2./NSG2: a D-2 model (WNr.1021, reportedly coded D3+HU) crewed by Uffz. Karsten and Fw. Blum, it was attacked while on a ferry flight and crashlanded at Hischel-bei-Uekerath. Both men were wounded and with 80% damage the aircraft was a write-off.

16.00 hrs. GMT, 24 February 1945:

Night G/A ops requested crossing places Linnich, Juelich, Schophoven. In Linnich bridge head, following localities: Gevenich and Glimbach.

Night ops for the whole night 24/2 to 25/2. Harassing attacks in the area Linnich – Düren.

One advantage for the Germans at the start of the GRENADE offensive lay in a system of dams which could, if they chose, unleash heavy flooding of the countryside downstream. Naturally these dams were fought over fiercely and during the night of 23/24 February a German assault detachment managed to blow up one which the Americans had occupied. During the afternoon of the 24th, Hallensleben issued orders that during the coming night there were to be uninterrupted air attacks to prevent American traffic from crossing the river before the resulting floods became fully effective. At 13.00, navigational instructions were issued: five visual beacons were to be employed as well as morse beacons at Bönninghardt, Krefeld and Düsseldorf; NSG2 was to arrange for the activation of two visual beacons from 17.45 to 06.00 hours; searchlights would be operating at Holzweiler and Oberembt.

Operational orders followed 50 minutes later: harassing attacks against traffic on the Roer bridges were to start as early as possible and to continue as long as the weather allowed. NSG 1 would take the area from Linnich to Jülich (inclusive of both towns) and NSG2 (Kommandeur, Maj. Robert Rohn) from south of Jülich, down to and including Düren. Traffiic was to be "decisively hindered" until the flooding achieved its purpose and a quick report was demanded on the state of the bridges; smokescreens were expected in the target area. The secondary target was all Allied movement west of the Roer. Aircraft were to be employed in groups of two or three, one carrying flares, and groups were to be constantly in Allied airspace and to attack "as long as opposition can be withstood." Bomb loads were to be 30% heavy SC (high explosive), 40% SD 10 or SD 15 and 10% SD 1 (fragmentation); bombs were to be dropped singly and afterward the Ju 87s were to strafe until their ammunition was exhausted.

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