At midnight on the 18th, Komm.Gen. Mittelitalien had announced his intention to mount a ground attack operation with fighter escort near Monticelli on the 19th. Seventy-five minutes later, the objective was confirmed as the area of Monticelli and Esperia (the latter newly taken by Fifth Army) and the time over target as 06.10 hours. Both messages were deciphered so promptly that British Intelligence gave nearly two hours’ warning of the attack, their signals carrying the highest priority, “ZZZZZ”. Jochen Prien has written that III./JG 53 provided the escort for this mission, during which one pilot from II./SG 4 was wounded. At 10.50 hours, Komm.Gen. Mittelitalien reported a morning attack by eight Bf 109s on Allied artillery positions. Listening in on their radio talk, the RAF’s No. 276 Wing reported fighters and fighter-bombers in the Cassino area from 10.33 hours. Eleven minutes later, a fighter-bomber formation was told to be ready to attack its target; two minutes later bombing was in progress with no Allied opposition; and at 10.53, some aircraft jettisoned their bombs. Seen from the HQ of No. 244 Wing RAF: It was the opinion that ‘Wing Ops had bought it again’ when some 190s swept in this morning and dropped their load. The bombs however fell about a mile away among a Polish encampment where there were some casualties. It is believed that the 190s mistook Venafro for Cassino, an error of judgement that was not popular among the inhabitants, nor for that matter, among us. 601, who were airborne at the time … they saw nothing, only felt somewhat smug when they heard over the R/T that Venafro was being bombed. The diarist of No. 417 Squadron recorded the Canadians' reaction: At about 11.30 hours ten Focke-Wulf 190’s dived on the valley from the north, dropped bombs near the town of Venafro and fled before a scrambled section could taken [sic] off. the raid apparently did no damage. … There were some amazing scenes on the Squadron as everyone dove for shelter when the bombs began dropping. Pay Parade was held today. Having met no Allied aircraft over the target, at 11.05 hours the attackers ran into RAF Spitfires: Shortly afterwards 145 [Squadron], scrambled from Nettuno, saw 10 190s going NW North of Rome. They chased, but lost them in cloud. Then they saw another ten where they had better luck; F/O Ekbery closed on one as it was in a gentle turn. Firing, he saw strikes followed by flame whereupon the pilot baled out. F/O McKenzie chased another which made very smartly for its base where intense flak prevented McKenzie doing anymore [sic] about it. The German pilot who jumped was Lt. Karl-Heinz Ahrens of 4./SG 4 (Fw 190 G-8, W.Nr.190062, white 3). Ahrens was reported wounded in action against Spitfires at Montefiascone.
Just after midnight, SG 4 was ordered to an hour’s readiness from dawn on the 20th onward for a ground attack mission and fighters were told to be ready to provide an escort. Although German troops attempted to counter attack in the Liri Valley, the Luftwaffe did not appear over the battle area during the day, perhaps because of poor weather during the morning. At 19.45 hours, Komm. Gen Mittelitalien signalled that a ground attack mission was impossible that evening as some of his fighter Gruppen were on operations and the rest not yet ready to go up again, so none was available for escort duties. At 23.30 hours however, SG 4 was told be at one hour’s readiness from 06.00 and the fighters of all Gruppen ready from 07.00 hours for escort assignments. continued on next page … |
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