Listening and Jamming (page13)

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A message five days later reiterated that 4./FAGr. 5 was disbanding and handing over its aircraft, personnel and equipment to bring 6.(F)/123 up to strength but the transfer of at least one aircraft seems to have been held up, for on 23 July 4./FAGr. 5 asked 6.(F)/123 for the earliest possible confirmation that Do 217, 9V+AM had landed. The remaining elements were planning to transfer by road at about 1700 GMT next day. A formal disbandment order was issued on 25 July with 6.(F)/123 given first call on any personnel needed to fill out its ranks. Luftflotte 3 on the 30th recorded that “By day weather, armed and radar reconnaissance flights were made”, the only such diary entry during July.

Radio monitoring on the night of 4/5 August revealed an aircraft of 6.(F)/123 in contact with Soesterberg from 21.06–21.58 and again from 01.54–02.25 when it was returning to Cormeilles. The Staffel’s disbandment was not reported complete until 23 August. Its successor, 6.(F)/123, was wound up in early September in Deelen, Holland.

Airborne monitoring and plotting of Allied radar emissions continued over the North Sea during the summer of 1944, apparently by attaching the Köthen signals trials establishment’s own aircraft to 3.(F)/122 in Holland. The Generalnachrichtenführer III. Abteilung (Signals Intelligence Division) at Berlin-Waldsee reported to the Luftwaffe Command Staff on 14 June that:

1.)	Reconnaissance has been carried out from about 4000 m, especially through flying east of 5º longitude between midnight and 0400. In that way the waveband of enemy shipborne search sets between 1.4 and 1.5 m, as well as the 9 cm waveband, can be observed with the corresponding receivers.
2.)	From the first missions it has been possible to build up a picture of the land-based radar sets in permanent operation on the east coast of England, so that on subsequent flights newly-arrived sets can be identified. Increased appearance of land-based radars and observation of mobile sets in these wavebands suggests special features.
	Radar sets deployed on ships east of the English coast can be distinguished from sets on land by reducing flying altitude. Land-based sets will no longer be picked up at low level.
3.)	Special occurrences, which the appearance of formations of ships leads one to expect, are to be reported to the Staffel’s ground station [as soon as] possible.
4.)	Other reconnaissance results in the field of radar reconnaissance are to be sent by telegram to the radio command post of Ob.d.L.

NOTE: Generalnachrichtenführer Gruppe III was headed by Hptm. Hans Kolb and dealt with air-surface radar sets. Referat (section) A handled ship and fighter search sets; B was responsible ofr identification, warning and homing equipment; C oversaw “special devices” and altimeters.

On 15 June, 3.(F)/122 had reported a strength of 3 (2) Ju 88, 7 (3) Ju 188 and 3 (2) Ju 88. It is not clear why there were two sets of Ju 88 figures unless, as sometimes happened, different models were counted separately. In the first set of figures W.Nr. 1751 is stated to be unserviceable, in the second set the u/s machine is W.Nr. 430259 (a D-7 which had been ready for collection from Buc on 20 May). The unserviceable Ju 188s were all F-1 models: 280194, 280217, 2219 and 281620. From this it appears that whilst Köthen’s radar monitors may have received support from 3.(F)/122 they were not accounted part of the Staffel.

NOTE: On 29 April, FAGr. 123 had asked when the workshops at Toul would finish installing transmitters into W.Nr. 281620 and 281622. These aircraft had been sent from Oranienburg to have the work done but by 1 May the latter had been wrecked in an attack on Toul and had to be scrapped.

Nor is there any hint of electronic reconnaissance in 3.(F)/122’s orders for the night of 16/17 June which seem more directed toward identifying any second Allied landing operation:

1.	Night P/R of harbours on the east coast of England with main effort over the Wash.
2.	Patrol north of the Channel Straits as far as the line Margate – Ostend in the early morning light.
3.	Patrol Dutch coast as far as the Dogger Bank at first light

Flying Mosquito Mk. XIX “VY•C” of No. 85 Squadron, F/O P.S. Kendall and F/L C.R. Hill took off from Swannington, Norfolk at 2205 GMT on an intruder patrol to Soesterberg and Deelen in Holland. They arrived in their patrol area within the hour, finding both airfields unlit. At 2326 however, Soesterberg was illuminated and an aircraft was seen to be landing with its navigation lights on. As the Mosquito moved to intercept, a red Verey light was fired and a second aircraft was seen to put on its navigation lights and begin to go round again.

Kendall gave chase, lowering flaps and landing gear to reduce speed, coming down to 140 IAS (225 km/h) at an altitude of 700 feet (213 m) as their target was turning into the flarepath for another landing attempt. Bursts of one and two seconds were fired as they closed in from 150 to 100 yards (137–91 m) with a ½-ring’s deflection, securing strikes on the enemy’s wing and fuselage. Now on fire, the hostile climbed to 2,000 ft (900 m), its navigation lights still on, before diving vertically to explode about 180 m short of the runway at 2330 GMT. Breaking away to take cine film of the burning wreck, Kendall and Hill resumed their patrol for another 20 minutes before returning to base, landing at 0043.

Although they had claimed an Me 110, the Mosquito’s crew had in fact destroyed a Ju 188 E-1, W.Nr. 260347 (GJ+SU). On the morning of the 17th, an Obltn. Sokowski (“currently 3.(F)/122") called Gen. Nafü III. Abt. and his account closely matched that of Kendall and Hill. The Ju 188 which was:

… returning from a radar-monitoring flight over the North Sea, at 0132 [GMT+2] on the approach to Soesterberg aerodrome was shot down by an enemy night fighter at 200 m altitude. The aircraft had made two circuits with its navigation lights switched on. The airfield was aware of the presence of 4–5 enemy night fighters in the vicinity. Aircraft totally destroyed by fire on impact. Crew dead.

Sokowski identified the crew but these are the ranks, forenames and spellings as recorded by the German War Graves Association, which differ somewhat in their spelling from his versions:

	Pilot	Ofw. Egidius Hagen
	Observer	Obltn. Heinrich Müller
	Wireless Operator	Fw. Karl Greim
	Flight Mechanic	Ofw. Willi Starke
	Radar-monitoring Operator	Uffz. Rudolf Heilemann

Appended to the file note of Sokowski’s call was a note that his Ju 188 was currently undergoing its 25-hour checks, after which it would be flown over to Köthen for an overhaul of its electronics. In addition, Obltn. Merker had proposed exchanging Obltn. Kaiser of I./KG 3 for Sokowski. The former, with 180 war flights, very good technical knowledge and “extremely interested in the radar-monitoring service” was thought better suited to fly the Ju 188. On the 18th, the Technical Officer of II.(Flugfunk)/Ln. Vers. Regt. Köthen requested the Gen. Nafü to arrange for the urgent replacement of the destroyed aircraft.

NOTE: II.(Flugfunk)/Ln. Vers. Regt. Köthen = II. Battalion (Air Electronics) of Air Signals Trials Regiment Köthen.

Nine days later, Køthen was allocated a Viktor radio-monitoring receiver and a Korfu 812 (centimetric radar warning set) for installation in a radar-monitoring Ju 188, callsign GF+SZ. By 6 July, work was also in hand to fit out Ju 388 L-0, W.Nr. 300006 (PG+YF) for the monitoring role, a telegram of 24 June listing the allocated equipment:

	1 Fanö receiver	[for the 38–75 cm waveband]
	1 Samos receiver	[for the 0.64–3.3 m waveband]
	2 GW 9 converters
	1 Philips oscillograph
	1 BC buzzer	(from the firm of Kimmel, 10 Hz – 180 kHz, without valves)

The radar-monitoring sets still outstanding from the original requirement would be allocated as they arrived and were to be fetched from Ob.d.L. signals control centre at Potsdam-Eiche. The same day, however a longer list was issued, which included a Korfu receiver; one set of radar monitoring receivers A–G; one Regina registration device; and a completeFuG 10 trailing antenna. this all came with a warning that the full suite of equipment was not available at present as new deliveries were still awaited.

NOTES: It is not known whether Ju 388 W.Nr. 300006 ever operated in the monitoring role. It was flown from Merseburg (a Junkers factory field) to Köthen on 31 March 1945 and appears to have been destroyed by the Germans before US troops took the aerodrome on 15 April.

Some sources describe Viktor as a transmitter, others as a receiver and it may be that the system included both components.

On 25 August Köthen was told that some of the requested equipment was being allocated and that electronics being removed from the Ju 388 were to be returned the Ob.d.L. radio control post. On 6 September it had been decided that an Rb 75/30 of 50/30 camera was urgently needed so that PG+YF could carry out combined electronic and photo reconnaissance while the following day a FuG 10 ZY set was indented for. The machine’s operational flights would be assigend by Gen. Nafü but it belonged to the Chef Technischer Luftrüstung (Head of Technical Air Armament).

Three weeks after this, OKL set out how radar monitoring aircraft were to be employed. Two Ju 188 were to be fitted out by I. Jagdkorps for Luftflotte Reich. One of the aircraft concerned was currently with IV./KG 30 at Aalborg in Denmark.

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