A mesage of 25 October from Ob. West appears to refer to the same plan (although "enemy large scale attacks" — probably »feindliche Großangriffe« in the original — could refer to air of ground operations): CX/MSS/T350/20 [decrypt issued to Allied commands as HP 4689 at 13.22 GMT on 27 October 1944] Memo from Chief of Staff, C-in-C West, signed Westphal to Army Group B, Army Group G and GAF Command West, dated 25/10: Ref: 1) Memo from C-in-C West, No. 9432; 2) Memo from OKW/Ops Staff signed Jodl, No. 773898 dated 24/10. In Ref 2) OKW/Ops Staff has decided with reference to request of C-in-C West in Ref 1) as follows: A) Preparations for the bringing up of very strong fighter forces in the event of enemy large scale attacks in the West are at present being made by OKL. A transfer of these forces before such a time is not possible for reasons connected with training and supplies of fuel … Other messages form this period dealt with the logistics of a large-scale fighter deployment: HP 4675 [decrypt issued at 08.41 GMT, 27 October 1944] Late 26th, 3. Jagddivision urgently requested from Luftgau XI data for GAF Stations Wunsdorf, (fair indications Dedelstorf), Nordhorn, Drope, Hustedt, Fürstenau, Meppen, Bissel, Wehnen (Comment: above included in airfields reported on by Luftgau XI on 26th, HP 4639). CX/MSS/T350/15 [intercepted at 18.45 GMT on 26 October 1944 and issued to Allied commands as HP 4687] See ref 714 attached to T351/21 Signed GABRIEL Oberst, GELIP ((Luftgau)) VI QM 1 No. 18886/44 to (B% GEDNA) ((Lfl. Reich)) Chief QM/QM 1 on 26/10 1) METEOR ((Jagdkorps (Roman) I)) and PARSIFAL ((3 JD)) require the stocking up of 11 A/F’s with DI [= C3] in connection with a project for the first few days of November. As a precaution a requirement of 500 cbm is requested as stocks are dispersed and cannot be moved about for sudden ops. 2) The following a/c armament amn. would be required: 300,000 rounds, 13 mm. incendiary HE/Electric for synchronised a/c armament 28,800 rounds each of 3 cm. machine cannon 108 and incendiary/HE 108. Remainder of amn. could be provided from stocks at disposal of the Luftgau. 3) To supply own flying units for 3 ops there is a lack of of stocks of 800 cbm DI. NOTE: Compare T349/64 and /108 for 3 JD’s interest in certain airfields in Luftgau XI. CX/MSS/T351/21 [decrypt timed at 17.45 GMT, 28 October 1944; issued to Allied commands as HP 4844] From GEKEM ((Jagdkorps)) (Roman) I, GEKUA ((Senior Signals Officer)) 3, Technical Superintendent (Signals) Liesegang, dated 27/10: In the first days of November, during bad weather and during operational attack £ scharfer Einsatz £, spoof wireless traffic will be carried on. More detailed order follows. For the spoof wireless traffic, a signals officer to participate at each battle HQ to superintend the spoof wireless service. These officers are to be detached to Korps by 31/10 for detailed instruction. Report to Superintendent Liesegang. HP 4844 … Comment: compare HP 4687 where the German for “sudden operations” could be more precisely rendered as “Lightning Blow.” All this was enough for W/C Walter G.H. Heath of RAF Air Intelligence 2(b) to issue, on 29 October, a report “Special Operation — G.A.F. Fighter Force” which detailed the bases likely to be used, the state of their repair facilities, runways and the number or aircraft each might accommodate, concluding that: In the area roughly between 50º 30’ N. and 53º N. and West of 9º there are enough airfields to accommodate 1100 fighters. The report did not concern itself with the nature of the “special operation” but on 7 November—and unknown to Bletchley—Göring's Reichsmarschall Order No. 7 urged Luftflotte Reich's fighter pilots on: Fighter airmen! For months the hard-fighting army has been engaged in decisive battles whose outcome means either victory or downfall. The Luftwaffe has been unable to fulfil the tasks assigned to it. In clear recognition of this position, our Führer has decided to give us the time necessary to rebuild and reconstitute our force. Comrades! The time is here. Now once more it is a matter of stepping up und proving that we have succeeded in forging the fighter arm anew — stronger, keener and more determined than ever. Now we must prove that the German people has not hoped in vain. that the German worker has not toiled n vain. But the enemy must feel that we will hit him with everything we have. Our troops and our homeland must breathe a sigh of relief and be able once more to look up at the sky with pride, in the knowledge that our fighters are keeping watch! Formation leaders! You lead your units against the enemy. If you waver, your men will despair along with you. But if you triumph, your entire unit will triumph with you. Fighter airmen! This is it. — The imminent large-scale operation of the fighter arm must be the hour in which a new, strong Luftwaffe, once again accustomed to victory, is born. Fight in a fanatical belief in victory. Be inspired with an unswerving attacking spirit, then victory will be yours. continued on next page … |
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PART FIVE OF SIX © Nick Beale 2012–2015 |
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