A measure of American progress on the ground is that the night’s targets for the heavy bombers were now SW of St. Lô: Nôtre-Dame-de-Cenilly (KG 2) and Le-Mesnil-Herman (KG 30 and KG 54). Time over target was set for 2045 hrs.—or 2200 if the weather improved—and it was hoped that a second operation could be mounted. The I./SKG 210 and II./KG 51 were to attack localities SE of Caen at 0330 and the latter unit was also to hold its Zerstörer ready for an intruder operation.

On the evening of the 29th, I./SKG 210 had 15 operational Fw 190s and I./KG 6 reported a strength of 22 (19) aircraft and 33 (31) crews. That night the latter unit dispatched 12 Ju 188s at 0321 hrs. and they dropped 118 x SC 50, 2 x SD 70, 12 x SC 500 and 12 x SC 1000 which caused “explosions and large fires” in St. Lô itself but Uffz. Komnick’s crew were posted missing on their 17th war flight. An aircraft of II./KG 6 was shot down at 2120, NW of Cahagnes (Calvados) and was a total loss although its four crew were unhurt and were returned to their unit. In all, Fliegerkorps IX mounted 242 sorties overnight, issuing this statement the following afternoon:

Ground troops are engaged in the most violent struggle against powerful superior forces. They are discharging their duties with very heavy sacrifices and with really heroic devotion. In order to help these troops in a critical situation a twofold operation was ordered in the night of 29/30 July.

I./KG 66, which under difficult conditions from point of view of flying and hard from point of view of the fighting, placed their markers on the last operations with typical elan without regard for defence, also carried this out yesterday. In all particularly difficult cases as also yesterday evening the Kommandeur of (((Roman) I./KG)) 66, Major Schmidt, personally carry this out. Up to the present no operation in support of the army has failed because of lack of or misplaced markers.

From their positions around Tessy-sur-Vire, 2. Panzer Div. reported that bombs from an estimated 60 friendly aircraft had fallen on German defence lines 3 km to the south but since communications were out the amount of damage done was not yet known.

At 1430 hrs. I/KG 2 reported that it had 16 (12) aircraft, evenly divided between Brétigny and Melun-Villaroche. Of the unserviceable machines, one had damage to its bomb doors, three had engine failure; and U5+DL had failed to return from an operational flight. For its part, I./KG 6 reported a strength of 21 (16) aircraft.

The Schnellkampf units were to attack Sallen and Caumont-sur-Aure (18 and 20 km east of St. Lô) at 2045 and the heavy bombers Le Mesnil-Herman five minutes later. Einsatzgruppe KG 101 was to go after ships off the mouth of the Orne from 2235 hours and II./KG 51’s heavy fighters were to be ready for intruder operations. Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle had ordered at 0945 that, weather permitting, Fliegerdivision 2 was to mount a torpedo attack on Allied supply convoys in the Channel. (This message was deciphered by 2042 hrs. that day and telephoned through from Bletchley Park to the Admiralty in view of its urgency). The proposed operation was to involve 25 Ju 88s crossing out to sea over Dieppe at 2045 (dusk) at 100–300 m, bound for the area north of Le Havre and Barfleur; they were to return over Fécamp an hour later. In the event 19 aircraft took part and low-level haze was such that only four crews attacked. According to Fl.Div. 2, “the result of the attack … can only be described as moderate”. The British frigate, HMS Retalick, reported engaging and driving off attacking enemy aircraft at 2050 GMT, 25 km off Cap d’Antifer. For the loss of one aircraft, 15,000 tons of shipping were claimed damaged while a further 13,000 tons and several other targets were attacked but with no effects observed owing to thick mist and smoke screens. Air Defence of Great Britain reported that about 15 hostile aircraft had operated over the shipping lanes between the Isle of Wight and the beach head.

Einsatzgruppe/KG 101 reported that after the night’s operations one of its Ju 88 S-3 and two A-4 had landed at St. Dizier around midnight while another S-3 had put down at Beauvais at 2019. That unit’s commander, Hptm. Kurt Capesius, advised IX. Fl.Kps. that based on crew debriefings the main body of shipping was in the western part of the target area; weather had been as forecast but horizontal attacks were hindered by a dense smokescreen although his crews’ attacks with PC Rs rocket-boosted bombs had been “favourable”. Overall 122 aircraft of Fl.Kps. IX undertook bombing and strafing of ground targets, troop concentrations and occupied villages and 23 He 111 of III./KG 3 launched the same number of flying bombs at London.

Tonight it was planned to attack troop concentrations and choke points along their supply lines from 2200 hours. Targets were assigned as follows: Le Mignon (KG 2); St. Denis-le-Gast (LG 1); Le Mignon (KG 2); Lengronne (KG 30); and Gavray-sur-Sienne (KG 54 and KG 6). All of these places were in the area 20–30 km SW of St. Lô. The I./KG 66 was to put down strong red ground marking in the centre of Gavray and the middle of the target area would be lit by four LC 50 from 2155 hours. The bombers were to approach over beacon Milbe (near Mayenne) and attack from east to west. If the weather was favourable, KG 2 and KG 54 would land on Dutch airfields but individual aircraft short of fuel could put down at Châteaudun, Orléans-Bricy, Brétigny, Melun or Montdidier. The reported effort for the night was 155 bombers: troops and vehicles on the La Haye– Pesnel – Villedieu road were shot up; bombing along the Lengronne – Coutances road left burning vehicles in its wake. Also attacked were villages, roads, AA positions and vehicles in the La Haye – Pesnel area.

Army Group B war diary for 07.55 GMT on 1 August: “Overnight very lively enemy air activity. Own Luftwaffe operations out-of-date because the targets have to be notified 12–14 hours in advance and thus have mostly been overtaken by events by the time our Luftwaffe comes into action”.

On the evening of 1 August, Jagdkorps II warned that:

The development of the ground situation … requires that by use of all resources and by operations in maximum strength, even in unfavourable weather, the enemy be prevented from breaking through further out of the Bay of Avranches towards the south or south-east.

Attention nevertheless had to be paid to the American to the Anglo-Canadian sector. The Luftwaffe’s intentions for the night entailed KG 6 illuminating and attacking Allied artillery positions just to the SE of Caen at 2300 GMT, coming in from east to west and backed up by the Schnellkampf units. At the same time the remaining bomber formations were to attack “traffic nodal points and troop targets” either side of the road between Caumont-l’Éventé and Saint Martin-des-Besaces. I./KG 66 would drop red markers in the centre of Saint-Jean des-Essartiers (roughly midway between Caumont and St. Martin) from 2245. The bombers would then run in from south to north at 2300 with KG 30 and LG 1 assigned to Caumont, KG 54 to Sept Vents and KG 2 to St. Jean.

For both operations the waypoints would be indicated by star shells and searchlights while friendly troops would mark the front lines with Verey lights, these measures lasting for 15–20 minutes. If conditions were favourable, KG 2 and KG 54 were to land in Holland, with Soesterberg warned to expect the latter’s III. Gruppe.

Allied analysis of call signs and aerodromes active during the operation suggested that LG 1, I./KG 2, KG 30 and III./KG 54 had all taken part. According to Luftflotte 3, 106 aircraft had attacked road junctions and troop concentrations either side of the St. Martin – Caumont-sur-Aure road, and (on the American front) bridges over the Sélune at Pontaubault were attacked twice. Returning crews reported explosions and fires in the Caumont area; an expanding fire after bombing St. Lô; a violent explosion in Pontaubault; fires and explosions on the roads to Pontorson and St. James; and hits on the built-up areas of Avranches.

continued on next page …

PART FOUR OF TEN

NOTE: All times in this article are GMT.

© Nick Beale 2022–25