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Cobra to Lüttich: 27 July–8 August 1944

From 10 to 20 July, between 60 and 140 aircraft were employed each night in 29 operations, principally in support of Army with very good effect, and also mining of the Seine Bay. 886 mines were laid. Shipping targets were also engaged. In 7 cases explosions occurred on ships. Own losses: 24 aircraft.

Tactical remarks, No. 40–44: In the operations in support of the Army during the night 24/25, bombs were were again dropped on our side of the lines. The marking of the front line was absolutely clear … With conscientious navigation there could have been no doubt among the crews as to the target. The crews are again to be emphatically instructed that the situation demands absolute reliability in carrying out orders given.

Fliegerkorps IX, 25 July 1944

In the last week of July, Allied offensives on the western side of the Cherbourg Peninsula (Operation COBRA on the 25h)) and south east of Caen (Operation BLUECOAT on the 30th) threatened to envelop the defending German armies. Too weak for the war it was fighting, Luftflotte 3 had to switch its bombers between multiple fronts. The IX. Fliegerkorps’ nightly effort in July averaged 106 sorties with a peak of 242 and if it hoped to intervene at all effectively it had little scope for dividing its forces..The critical target areas were widespread: a straight line from Caen to St. Lô is 50 km, from Caen to Avranches 90 km. The bombers were also needed to attack the ships supplying the Allied forces, either by mining (the most effective method) or direct attack with bombs, although they could also count on some help in these operations from Fl.Kps. X (III./KG 100’s Do 217s and their guided weapons) and Fliegerdiv. 2 (up to four Gruppen of Ju 88 torpedo bombers drawn from KG 26 and KG 77, the latter in the process of disbanding). Not all of the assigned bomber Gruppen were immediately available for operations, some were in Germany to rest and refit, for conversion to new types or in the process of dissolution.

IX. Fliegerkorps, 25 July 1944

The Luftwaffe's bomber force in the West was dispersed across bases in four countries. The Krops also had a Transport and Liaison Staffel at Beaumont-sur-Oise while the replacement/training IV. Gruppen and Ergänzungstaffeln of its units were stationed on airfields in Germany, Denmark and Hungary.

 

 

 

 

 

 

France

Belgium

Netherlands

Germany

KG 2

 

 

 

 

Stab & I./KG 2.

Beauvais-Le Coudray

 

 

 

II./KG 2

 

 

Gilze-Rijn

 

KG 6

 

 

 

 

Stab, rear echelon of I./KG 6, flying elements of
II./KG 6

 

 

 

Münster-Handorf (transfer to Achmer ordered)

III./KG 6

 

 

 

Ahlhorn

KG 30

 

 

 

 

Stab & I./KG 30 (flying elements)

 

Le Culot

 

 

II./KG 30 (flying elements)

 

 

 

Zwischenahn

KG 51

 

 

 

 

Stab

 

 

 

Landsberg-Lech

I./KG 51 (Stab, 2. & 3. Staffeln)

 

 

 

Lechfeld

1./KG 51

 

 

 

Schwäbisch Hall

II./KG 51

St. Quentin-Clastres

 

 

 

I./SKG 10

Tours-West

 

 

 

Advance party Eins. Kdo. KG 51 (Schenck)

Châteaudun

 

 

 

KG 54

 

 

 

 

Stab & I./KG 54 (flying elements)

 

 

Eindhoven

 

Stab
(remaining elts.)

 

 

 

Marx

I./KG 54
(rear echelon)

 

 

 

Wittmundhaven

III./KG 54 (flying elements

 

 

Soesterberg

 

(remaining elements)

 

 

 

Marx

LG 1

 

 

 

 

Stab & I./LG 1

 

Melsbroek

 

 

II./LG 1

 

 

 

Rheine

I./KG 66
(flying elements)

Montdidier

 

 

 

(remaining elements)

 

 

 

Avord
(transfer to Achmer ordered)

Eins. Gr. 101

 

 

 

 

Stab & 1. Staffel

St. Dizier

 

 

 

2. Staffel

 

 

 

Nordhausen

3. Staffel

 

 

 

Kolberg

The terminology in German reports about bombing operations can be deceptive. Schnellbomber (fast bombers) were the Fw 190s of I./SKG 10 and the Me 410s of II./KG 51 (the latter Gruppe being divided into bombers and intruders). Heavy units flew the Ju 88, Ju 188 and Do 217, none of which was more than a medium bomber by 1944 Allied standards. The Luftwaffe further distinguished between the Ju 88 A and S models, effectively treating them as separate types. “Concentrated attacks” were perhaps more about time than space: for example the objectives for 25/26 July (see below) were spread over a piece of countryside about 4 km across and 5 km top to bottom while apart from Cormelles the targets were no more precisely defined than “the area of” named locations. Many of the damage assessments seem little better than wishful thinking and of scarcely any intelligence value: “good results can be expected” for example.

continued on next page …

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PART ONE OF TEN


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© Nick Beale 2022–23


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