Evidence that the II./KG 51 would soon be entering combat came in a message telling the 6. Staffel to contact Luftgau XI (in north west Germany) about supplies of spares and jet engines. The Gruppe’s Technical Officer wanted to know what they arranged.

A report thought to emanate from I./KG 51 was not intercepted in full but the Allies did learn from it that one Staffel was ready for fighter operations, its aircraft fitted with four cannon. Remaining aircraft could only be flown with empty auxiliary (secondary?) tanks because of weight, limiting endurance to 40 minutes (this may refer to the carriage of bombs by four-gun machines). Aircraft in their dispersals needed 45 minutes’ notice to get airborne; a quicker reaction time was only achievable if they sat on the runway but this was not permissible owing to the lack of camouflage.

Oberstleutnant Wolfgang Schenck, until now I./KG 51’s Kommandeur, assumed command of the Geschwader on this date.

The I./KG 51 was unable to fly during the early morning because heavy showers and Allied fighters over their base. Seven aircraft took off from 11.00–11.33 on an “attack against fighter-screen.” Two suffered engine failure and promptly turned back while the undercarriage of a third would not retract. The remaining four attacked Allied fighter formations which were able to evade their fire by turning (both American and British fighters claimed to have damaged Me 262s). Feldwebel Schmidt attacked a straggling B-17, setting its port engine on fire before it evaded into cloud. The engagement took place in map squares GQ3–GP3, ground observers confirmed that a Fortress crashed in flames in GP1 and Schmidt’s claim was accredited. One Me 262 (it is not clear which) was hit in the engine during these actions but all had landed by 12.20 hrs.

Two more Messerschmitts took off at 11.42 hrs. on a weather reconnaissance around Aachen. They dropped bombs on Oeffelt but because because of some kind of damage they could not attack the Aachen area. Cloud was too thick for any results to be seen and they landed at 12.13.

By 13.00 hrs. the weather had again closed in although one aircraft had just taken off. Otherwise the intention for the rest of the day was “immediate restoration of operational readiness of the fighter Staffel.” A supplementary report filed three days later explained that this last Me 262 had been assigned targets around Aachen; bad weather meant that at 13.23 hrs. instead it bombed the Allied airfield at Grave from 3,000 m. through a gap in the clouds. The impact of its two SD 250 canisters could not be observed, the aircraft’s R/T failed over the target and the weather compelled the pilot to divert to Varrelbusch where he landed at 13.45 hrs. About the only piece of good fortune on this sortie was that six Thunderbolts seen during the return flight did not attack.

The Geschwader was not yet an all-jet formation: IV./KG 51 was told to send a crew to Landsberg-Lech to collect an Fi 156, 9K+DA, which would be made serviceable by the 9th. Another message, from an Operations Officer in KG 51, advised that tomorrow’s weather would probably be suitable for ferrying aircraft.

Jagdkorps II’s orders for the day included the following:

KG 51 will, in the event of raids by four-engined aircraft, be released to break up and harass [the] enemy fighter screen, under Geschwader’s own control.

Attacks on enemy movements and concentrations are to be continued, if weather permits, against [the] following targets: Kleinhau, Grosshau, Koslar, Weissweiler, Gereonsweiler, Sittard, Aldenhoven, Geilenkirchen, Easchweiler, Rötgen, in that order of priority.

Since no aircraft had taken off by 14.00 hrs. owing to “high mist and low visibility”, the I. Gruppe was stood down from its 45-minute readiness.

Another of II./KG 51’s aircraft was lost in the Hessental, Me 262 A-2 W.Nr. 500010, 9K+KM. Hauptmann Helmut Brocke was on an air-firing practice when his “steering unit” (controls?) jammed, the aircraft crashed and caught fire at 10.58 hrs. Brocke was killed and two days later II./KG 51 was asking for his posthumous promotion to Major, while Oblt. Gersch was appointed as acting CO of 4./KG 51.

There were 23 Me 262s of I./KG 51 at Hopsten that evening.

Once again I./KG 51 sent up seven Me 262s on anti-Jabo patrol from 10.17–10.22 they were all back on the ground by 11.00 hrs. Patrolling at 2,000 m. in the Rheine – Osnabrück – Münster area, once Schwarm did not contact hostile aircraft because their Benito control failed. The other group engaged a group of 12 Thunderbolts which evaded by banking but managed to knock out an engine on one of the Messerschmitts which landed safely nevertheless. Another such patrol in the same area from 11.50–12.39 hrs. was unsuccessful due to sharp changes of course on the enemy’s part. There were no bombing missions because of the bad weather.

The II. Gruppe was also flying fighter sorties, scrambling its alarm Rotte — Stabsfw. Hans Zander and Fw. Bendsen — at 11.35 hrs. At 12.02 Zander was pulling out after diving through a gap in the clouds over Schwäbisch Gmünd when he was bounced by six American fighters, shot down and killed. His Me 262 A-2 (W.Nr. 500009, 9K+IM) was 98% destroyed and showed hits in the starboard nacelle and undercarriage fairing. The victorious pilot was Lt. Harry L. Edwards of the 352nd FG.

Bendsen landed at 12.20 hrs.without contacting enemy aircraft.

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PART THREE OF FIVE