continued …

‘TSA 2 underwent trials at the Rechlin testing establishment during 1944 …’

In the latter part of the year the TSA 2A was being tested on the Me 262 and Ar 234 and although Messerschmitt at Schwäbisch Hall was supposed to be fitting the 2A in 20 Me 262s, work had yet to start as of 28 October. By 18 November a 2D model had arrived in Rechlin after Zeiss had been unable to meet earlier delivery dates and it was noted that production in sufficient numbers would not begin ‘until next year’. The position with the Fw 190 as of 28 October had been described as follows:

At present Fw 190 ground attack aircraft drop their bombs using the Revi as a simple sighting device. With employment of shallow-dive targeting devices greater accuracy would be possible, or the same accuracy from greater altitudes. On account of the limited field of vision of about 5.5º it is not possible to employ a device other than the TSA 2D. The TSA 2D will first arrive in sufficient quantities to equip a large number of Fw 190 ground attack aircraft early in 1945.

There is nothing here to suggest that the 54 Fw 190s so far allocated for TSA conversion (or the 17 ‘Fw 190 F-8/TSA’ assigned to I./SG 5) had been fitted with the 2A variant, nor any mention of operational experience. The report went on to say that TSA 2D could be used from altitudes of 0–6,000 m, dive angles of 15–68º and speeds of 500–1,000 km/h.

Rechlin proposed the BZA 3 (Bombenzielanlage = bomb targeting equipment) with a periscope attachment as stopgap, with operational testing by EKdo. 26 at Udetfeld. Although the former device was less accurate, 2,400 of them were in storage at Zeiss-Ikon.

Sources: Bundesarchiv RL 36/86: Erprobungsstelle Rechlin, Wochen- und Schwerpunktsberichte, Bd. 4 (Juli–Dez. 1944).

RL 36/102: Erprobungsstelle Rechlin, Entwicklung und Erprobung von Waffen und Munition, Bd. 41: Focke-Wulf Fw 190 mit Bombenzielanlage BZA-3 und Grabenspiegel, Kurzerprobung.- Schlußbericht (28. Oktober 1944)

(Page 111) Trial and Error (June–July 1944)

General Staff papers from 9 June 1944 include the following report from Oberst Eckard Christian: ‘A Gruppe of KG 200 (Oberst Heigl) has 10 officers and 29 men ready for operations in a Totaleinsatz. In addition 200 men of the airborne troops and paratroops are available for a special operation.’ Apparently the smaller group was dinstinct from what became Kdo. Schäfer so may well hav been the pilots of Kdo. Lange. A day later, Gen. Koller advised Christian that the order had been given for Heigl to make preparations but that a decision on the operation itself had been reserved but from the information given, it is impossible to be sure which of Heigl’s forces was being discussed. On 18 June, a message for Christian advised that the question of a Totaleinsatz with the Fw 190 was undecided as the Reichsmarschall had yet to speak to the Führer on the matter

Sources: Bundesarchiv RL 2-I/72: Lageorientierungen und Einsatzplanungen.- Besprechungs-, Tages-, Vortrags- und Aktennotizen (Fragmente) Bd. 3 (Juni–Juli 1944)

Bundesarchiv RL 2-I/79: Lageorientierungen und Einsatzplanungen.- Tagesverlauf, Besprechungsnotizen, Bd. 1 (März-Juni 1944)

Bundesarchiv RL 2-I/80: Lageorientierungen und Einsatzplanungen.- Tagesverlauf, Besprechungsnotizen, Bd. 2 (Juni–Nov. 1944)

(page 111) Note 6: SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Trippel

The article quoted Chef TLR as saying in 1945 that, ‘Trippel knew how to establish a good relationship with the Armaments Plenipotentiary’ but was perhaps optimistic in the light of Trippel’s track record.

An internal SS investigation into his factory had been initiated in January 1942, relating to ‘purely economic issues’. The Kriegsmarine was proceeding against Trippel for failures (which he denied) in torpedo production. He was to have manufactured a new torpedo, something much needed since the type in use dated back to 1922 and had a 60% failure rate. Now OKL was protesting that the SS had handed over its interests to the naval authorities without justification and that the latter had abandoned commitments made to the Luftwaffe. Since not only Trippel but Himmler himself was being maligned, the SS took the airmen’s side and Gauleiter Wagner was charged with restoring order.

However it seems that by January 1943 the Gestapo too had got involved, as well as the SS-Hauptamt (Main Office). Suspected of misappropriating The Reich’s resources for his own financial advantage, Trippel was complaining of the problems this was giving him in running his business. He had pointed out that he enjoyed the full confidence of the Reichsführer and was working, now as ever, for the SS but the allegations were sufficiently concrete and the factory so important to the war effort that the Strasbourg Field Office considered an investigation by the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) absolutely essential.

Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger was told by a member of the Reichsführer’s personal staff in April 1943 that ‘the incident’ had been brought to Himmler’s attention and the latter was ‘of course in favour of … Trippel being protected by us’. A letter from Berger dated 29 June advised Himmler that, ‘Only by the intervention of the Reichsführer was it possible to afford Sturmbannführer Trippel the necessary support’. Berger noted that it had taken the the industrialist 13 months to convert the factory to torpedo production, that the 1,000th one had come off the production line on 12 June and that despite all the difficulties Himmler’s personal involvement had paid off.

Source: Bundesarchiv NS 19/2683: Verschiedene Forschungs- und Produktionsvorhaben (Torpedos usw.) des SS-Sturmbannführers Hans Trippel bzw. der Trippel-Werke im Zusammenhang mit Ermittlungen des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes u. a. wegen Veruntreuung von Reichsmitteln (1943)

(Page 114) Training and Testing (September 1944)

Included in the Quartermaster General’s statement of the operational readiness of flying units on 10 September 1944 is the following:

II./KG 200 will be trained on the Fw 190 BT 1400 and, after completion of that training, reorganised as:

1 Staffel of Fw 190s ‘Einhorn’

1 Staffel of Fw 190s ‘BT 1400’

1 instructional Staffel.

Source: Bundesarchiv RL 2-III/732b: Personelle und materielle Einsatzbereitschaft, Bd. 64 (20. Aug.–10. Sept. 1944)(Page 121) Training in Italy (5 October–18 November 1944)

(Page 121) Training in Italy (5 October–18 November 1944)

On 12 November, Einhorn had one Fw 190 damaged through human error, it was not on operations.

Source: Bundesarchiv RL 2-III/857: Materialverluste.- Flugzeuge.- Einsatz alle Fronten.- Listen, Bd. 15, Schlachtverbände, Nr. 1–52 (1941–1945)

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