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29 June

At 1505, two Bf 110 were damaged by splinters when 12–15 Bleheims bombed Abbeville-Drucat aerodrome.

A Go 145 of 7./JG 53, DD+HY crashed at Craon while on a courier flight from Rennes to Paris; two NCO’s were slighly injured and the aircraft was 80% damaged.

Operations over England, apparently during the night of 29-30/6. Nine He 111 of KG 4 left Wittmundhafen before 22.05 and landed by 02.50 at an unknown airfield. Their instructions were to carry out Störangriffe (harassing attacks) on industrial plants in Central England … One had to return with engine trouble shortly before reaching English coast, and dropped its bombs at random to lighten the machine. One He 111 crashed, apparently on landing and was totally destroyed, two men were badly hurt and one slightly.

30 June

It was reported at 11.45/ that I./KG 76 (based at Beauvais) lost one Do 17 Z (F1+CL) in an accident at Wiener Neustadt.

Flak Regt. 201 reported that in an air battle over St. Valéry that afternoon a Hurricane was shot down, and probably also a Bristol Blenheim. On the German side an Me 109 was shot down and a second made a forced landing. The Salvage Corps from Abbeville were dealing with the latter.

III./KG 76 reported to Fliegerkorps I that it had 14 aircraft out of action for over 48 hours: 6 for overhaul and replacement of motors, 8 for repair of battle damage. Repairs were partly being carried out in Bonn, where new engines were expected, and would not be completed before 7 July. Bonn lacked some equipment and Wiesbaden was short of specialist personnel, as the shop was overworked with III./JG 3, and some of KG 3. Next day, III./ZG 76 reported only three Do 17 Z serviceable immediately, 11 serviceable in 24 hours and 14 beyond 24 hours.

7./JG 53 reported that aircraft DD+HY, on courier duty between Rennes and Paris, had an accident resulting in 80% damage; the two NCO’s of the crew were slightly injured.

At 20.00 on 3 July, JG 51’s HQ issued the following report about operations on 30 June:

The enemy made armed reconnaissance flights in strength up to midday. Our own aircraft, though considerably outnumbered, were able to intercept owing to excellent Freya-Meldung.

Four enemy aircraft were accounted for at one place [in one action?], and at other places three and two respectively. Four Me 109 were shot down, three of which were able to make forced landings at Étaples. Their pilots were not seriously injured. Our aircraft were unable to obtain further successes owing to the order forbidding operations in barrage area Cap Gris Nez, Marquise, Samrr [sic = Samer?], Canniers [sic = Caffiers?].

It is very desirable that the balloon barrage should be up from 21.00 to early dawn. The already weakened Geschwader lost a further five or six aircraft which were shot down or made emergency landings.

If effective fighter defence was to be provided it was essential that I./JG 1 should be moved immediately from Jever to the operational area and the Gruppen brought up to strength as quickly as possible. In particular six Me 109 were urgently required fitted with ’N’ engines capable of intercepting fast, high flying enemy a/c.

In conjunction with Army Signals Officer it had been laid down that the upper wires of the lines especially set up by the postal services should be reserved exclusively for the use of the GAF [German Air Force]. This has not been observed with the result that the direction of operations against enemy aircraft is interrupted, so that it is impossible to intercept the enemy.

Neighbouring Geschwader have been warned to cross when necessary into the defensive area of JG 51, i.e. Ostende, Cape Gris-Nez, St. Valéry, Béthune, especially in the coastal area. This is constantly necessary. Very often it happens that in their particular area there are no enemy to engage and entirely useless operations have been carried out against an alleged enemy.

The fitting out of Air Reporting Posts with suitable optical equipment is very bad. If practical results are expected, each post, or at least every other post, must be equipped with Schenwerferrichtungsweiser (searchlight control gear). Similarly the officers’ lookout posts must on all accounts be provided with this equipment.

Further the new Battle HQ of JG 51 at Wissant has been operating since 3/7: thereby the fastest possible communication is ensured with the Air Reporting Centre of 7/1 Air Reporting Company, which is in the same building , and with the Operational Intelligence Unit.

Owing to billeting difficulties the Administrative Staff is to remain in Le Touquet. At the same time the emergency Battle HQ for communication with back areas is to be manned by an officer day and night from 4/7. Communications with Battle HQ and Administrative Staff at Le Touquet through St. Omer.

Document signed by Osterkamp, Oberst and Kommodore.

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