Since early on the 13th August, enemy aircraft activity over this country has been on a scale far in excess of anything hitherto carried out.

British Home Security Report

Beginning of the intensified air war against England.

Seekriegsleitung daily report, 13 August 1940

The next batch of reports was produced between 07.05 on 13 August and 03.00 next morning. Unlike later in the war, issue times do not appear against individual decrypts, so one cannot tell whether any of them was useful in warning of German intentions.

At 06.30 on the 13th, ZG 2 had told V.(Z)/LG 1 to report to it by radio times of take-off and landing, the number of aircraft taking part and the results of the operation. At 08.55, IV. Fliegerkorps advised ZG 76 and “an unspecified JG formation on Guernsey” (presumably elements of JG 53) that the attack planned for 11.00 hrs. was postponed; they should be ready again at 13.00 hours and an exact start time would be notified.

A signal deciphered that night contained V.(Z)/LG 1’s response (albeit addressed to ZG 76) to the above request. Some 23 aircraft had been involved, taking off from 10.10 for an armed reconnaissance of the Yeovil–Salisbury area, at 5–6,000 metres. Crossing the English coast at the Isle of Purbeck at 11.00, over the next half-hour they became entangled with “between 50 and 100 Spitfire, Hurricane and Curtiss”, claiming nine and losing five. A later message added that of the five missing Bf 110s, one had exploded in mid-air and another’s crew had bailed out over land. The Gruppe expected to have only 15 aircraft ready the next day’s operations.

At 17.45, I. and II./KG 55 were also told that “Curtiss 40” fighters had been encountered during the day’s attack on Portland, a type “definitely known to be equipped with cannons.” As if that (imaginary) hazard weren’t enough, the effect of the Royal Navy’s AA fire was “extraordinarily great”. This assessment was apparently shared at the top for at 13.00 on 14 August, IV. Fliegerkorps passed on to (H) 41 an order from Göring that enemy naval bases and warships were to be left alone on both outward and return flights, in view of the power of their anti-aircraft defences. Warships were only to be attacked on the Fliegerkorps’ orders and after thorough reconnaissance.

These operational messages were also deciphered overnight:

II./JG 53 reported that 22 of its Bf 109s had engaged the RAF, losing one and claiming a Hurricane shot down in flames.

Leutnant Wieberg told ZG 2 at 18.40 on the 13th that he had force landed 25 km. north of Le Havre with both himself and his crewman unscathed. He claimed to have shot down two aircraft.

Late on Adlertag, V. Fliegerkorps 5 passed on information from the “listening service” (Horchdienst) which “proved conclusively” that the RAF had moved several squadrons down from the North East, with numerous others in transit:

In the air observation area “COBAL”, 2 permanent Staffeln.

At ROGAT, 1 permanent Staffel, 4 others in the traffic (“in Verkehr”). These Staffeln came from the N.E. coast of ENGLAND.

At WOODY-SUNOUP (sic), 3 permanent Staffeln and 2 “in Verkehr.”

At BANDY, 4 permanent Staffeln and 2 “in Verkehr.”

At DOWNY, 5 permanent Staffeln and 3 “in Verkehr.”

At DEWDROP, 1 Staffel “in Verkehr.”

AT LIVERPOOL, 2 permanent Staffeln.

What was more, the Horchdienst had observed that:

In the attacks between Portland and Selsey Bill British fighters were guided to the Isle of Wight, as far as possible to decisive points. There has been a renewal of heavy wireless traffic from Warmwell aerodrome [and] English fighters nearly always attack and pursue Ju 88s even in a dive.

This “conclusive proof” that Southern England was being reinforced at the North's expense may have influenced the planning of the ill-fated attacks by Luftlotte 5 from Scandinavia against the North East two days later. The other theme emerging from this report and the tactical directive mentioned earlier is that the Luftwaffe was somewhat disconcerted by the repeated ability of the RAF’s control system to place the defending fighters just where they were needed.

At 23.30 hrs., ZG 76 gave V.(Z)/LG 1 its orders for the morrow:

Repetition of 2 Frühstück (= Breakfast 2). Zero-hour 08.30.

V./LG 1 (jumping-off ground Lessay) to reinforce III./ZG 76 in giving fighter-protection to II./Stuka 2 in attack on Target No. 10256. Arrangements to be agreed with III./ZG 76 (Jersey), as the senior formation, by telephone at 06.45.

Meeting with II./Stuka 2 at zero minus 50–45 min. at … 6500 m. over Jersey. Turning-in of R/T frequency to be arranged direct with III./ZG 76.

In case of bad weather, orders to suspend operations will be given direct by Jafü 3. Landing after operations at Rocquancourt.

Next operation on 14/8 probably 5 Frühstück (= Breakfast 5).

continued on next page…

PART THREE OF FOUR