A mesage of 25 October from Ob. West appears to refer to the same plan (although "enemy large scale attacks" — probably »feindliche Großangriffe« in the original — could refer to air of ground operations):
CX/MSS/T350/20 [decrypt issued to Allied commands as HP 4689 at 13.22 GMT on 27 October 1944]
Memo from Chief of Staff, C-in-C West, signed Westphal to Army Group B, Army Group G and GAF Command West, dated 25/10:
Ref: 1) Memo from C-in-C West, No. 9432; 2) Memo from OKW/Ops Staff signed Jodl, No. 773898 dated 24/10.
In Ref 2) OKW/Ops Staff has decided with reference to request of C-in-C West in Ref 1) as follows:
A) Preparations for the bringing up of very strong fighter forces in the event of enemy large scale attacks in the West are at present being made by OKL. A transfer of these forces before such a time is not possible for reasons connected with training and supplies of fuel …
Other messages form this period dealt with the logistics of a large-scale fighter deployment:
HP 4675 [decrypt issued at 08.41 GMT, 27 October 1944]
Late 26th, 3. Jagddivision urgently requested from Luftgau XI data for GAF Stations Wunsdorf, (fair indications Dedelstorf), Nordhorn, Drope, Hustedt, Fürstenau, Meppen, Bissel, Wehnen (Comment: above included in airfields reported on by Luftgau XI on 26th, HP 4639).
CX/MSS/T350/15 [intercepted at 18.45 GMT on 26 October 1944 and issued to Allied commands as HP 4687]
See ref 714 attached to T351/21
Signed GABRIEL Oberst, GELIP ((Luftgau)) VI QM 1 No. 18886/44 to (B% GEDNA) ((Lfl. Reich)) Chief QM/QM 1 on 26/10
1) METEOR ((Jagdkorps (Roman) I)) and PARSIFAL ((3 JD)) require the stocking up of 11 A/F’s with DI [= C3] in connection with a project for the first few days of November. As a precaution a requirement of 500 cbm is requested as stocks are dispersed and cannot be moved about for sudden ops.
2) The following a/c armament amn. would be required:
300,000 rounds, 13 mm. incendiary HE/Electric for synchronised a/c armament
28,800 rounds each of 3 cm. machine cannon 108 and incendiary/HE 108.
Remainder of amn. could be provided from stocks at disposal of the Luftgau.
3) To supply own flying units for 3 ops there is a lack of of stocks of 800 cbm DI.
NOTE: Compare T349/64 and /108 for 3 JD’s interest in certain airfields in Luftgau XI.
CX/MSS/T351/21 [decrypt timed at 17.45 GMT, 28 October 1944; issued to Allied commands as HP 4844]
From GEKEM ((Jagdkorps)) (Roman) I, GEKUA ((Senior Signals Officer)) 3, Technical Superintendent (Signals) Liesegang, dated 27/10:
In the first days of November, during bad weather and during operational attack £ scharfer Einsatz £, spoof wireless traffic will be carried on. More detailed order follows. For the spoof wireless traffic, a signals officer to participate at each battle HQ to superintend the spoof wireless service. These officers are to be detached to Korps by 31/10 for detailed instruction. Report to Superintendent Liesegang.
… Comment: compare HP 4687 where the German for “sudden operations” could be more precisely rendered as “Lightning Blow.”
All this was enough for W/C Walter G.H. Heath of RAF Air Intelligence 2(b) to issue, on 29 October, a report “Special Operation — G.A.F. Fighter Force” which detailed the bases likely to be used, the state of their repair facilities, runways and the number or aircraft each might accommodate, concluding that:
In the area roughly between 50º 30’ N. and 53º N. and West of 9º there are enough airfields to accommodate 1100 fighters.
The report did not concern itself with the nature of the “special operation.”
On 7 November, I. Jagdkorps had given a rundown of its fighter units, their equipment and roles. On the afternoon of the 12th, a message was sent to the advance party of III./JG 3 care of the Flak barracks at Iserlohn, SE of Dortmund, making reference to orders from I. Jagdkorps and Luftflotte Reich, both dated 4 November. While the subject of the present message was accommodation, there was a clear preoccupation with ensuring that a deployment involving plural Geschwader should remain undetected:
CX/MSS/T367/53 [decrypt timed at 00.04 GMT, 14 November 1944; issued to Allied commands as HP 6557]
Luftflotte Reich expressly forbids unauthorised billeting of the advance detachments sent off under [I. Jagdkorps’ orders] as this jeopardises camouflage most seriously.
… officers of the [Luftwaffe’s] ground organisation are solely responsible for the billeting of the units … Frequenting of the inhabited places [i.e. towns and villages] is to be prevented … make this order known to all advance detachments of the Geschwader [plural].
According to Galland, by 12 November everything stood ready for the operation and it was just a matter of waiting for the right weather. The scheme was aborted by an order to prepare the fighter arm for tactical support a major land offensive in the West. This seems borne out by Göring’s order 10325/44 of 14 November to Luftflotte Reich, “Instructions for preparation and conduct of Luftwaffe operations for the Army’s attack in the West.” Although the offensive was planned to begin “during bad weather”, II. Jagdkorps (with 3. Jagddivision subordinated) was directed:
(aa) by single concentrated stroke against all airfields near front to knock out close support forces;
(bb) main task fighter protection to assure freedom of movement of troops …
continued on next page …
PART FIVE OF SIX
© Nick Beale 2012–2015