In the event just one Me 262 attacked attacked the designated target area.

Two strength reports were submitted during the day, one showing 3 (2) aircraft and 5 (5) pilots. The other, from the Kommando to Luftflotte 3, was apparently sent later because it gave 3 (1) aircraft and 5 (2) pilots.

In both reports Ofw. Lauer's Me 262 A-1, (WNr. 170002, GL) was "off strength" while in the second two unspecified machines were rated unserviceable for the next 24 hours, one needing a new nose, the other with damage to its undercarriage. Salvage of the shot down Messerschmitt was to be carried out by the station Command at Brussels-Evère.

At 17.00 hrs. the IX. Fliegerkorps gave issued a lengthy order transferring its units to new bases by early next morning. Schenck's destination was to be Chièvres, south west of Brussels. At 19.45 however, the Korps informed the Kommando that it was being temporarily withdrawn from operations and transferred from Juvincourt to Volkel in Holland, close to the German border. The new airfield was to be stocked up "in accordance with special requirements for Me 262" while KG 51 was ordered to transfer by lorry all equipment that would allow conclusions to be drawn about the characteristics of the Me 262. Other equipment was to go by rail from Ath (near Chièvres aerodrome). Damaged aircraft were either to be brought back later or, if they could not be repaired, destroyed completely. Reports were to be made when flying and ground personnel were sent off and when they reached Volkel. Orders about the supply of replacement Messerschmitts would come later from the Fliegerkorps.

Earlier that afternoon, Luftflotte 3 had announced that its Arado 234 reconnaissance aircraft were also being transferred to Volkel.

IX. Fliegerkorps sent a message requesting Luftflotte 3's whereabouts so that an officer could report there to inspect operational airfields for the Me 262.

That night, the Fliegerkorps asked the Flivo (aviation liaison officer) with Army Group B to notify target areas for daylight harassing attacks. There was a proviso: because of "the special aircraft type involved" pin-point objectives were not being attacked and instead the Flivo was asked to pass on only large targets such as localities or troop assemblies covering a wide area. What the message refers to but does not spell out is the height restriction (a 4000 m. minimum) which higher authority had imposed on Me 262 operations over enemy territory. This may have put the Blitzbomber out of reach of almost all light or medium AA fire but it also ensured that, with no bombsight, they had no chance of hitting their targets.

Major Schenck reported that all three of his aircraft had landed in Volkel and had been made serviceable once technical personnel had arrived. However, apart from the Signals Platoon, the rest of the ground echelon had yet to turn up. Three pilots were on the airfield and ready to fly: himself, Jäger and Gutmann. Lauer and Schulz were on their way but the latter was ill.

At Volkel there was an 1800 m. runway orientated NE–SW but the rest of the landing area had been destroyed. Eindhoven was the alternative, with a 1600 m. NE–SW runway and Tornado direction finding gear which Volkel lacked.

Lauer's aircraft had been salvaged by the Airfield Command at Brussels-Evère and was being brought to Volkel for cannibalisation. Another Me 262 had crash landed near Charleville with 70% damage and individual components had been removed from it. Originally Luftflotte 3 had ordered it to be transported to Germany but then called for its destruction as the situation on the ground deteriorated. Schenck had then asked Plocher [another officer?] to bury or sink any remaining engine parts or take them to Germany. He had been assured this would happen but could not confirm that it had been done. The Einsatzkommando itself was not taking any other steps.

During the day, more elements of Schenck's unit arrived in Volkel, including the spare jet engines but he reported that the whereabouts of "further engines" were still unknown. Five overdue lorries came in without equipment but the field kitchen was lost and so far the necessary replacement was not obtainable. He also asked that the 12 motorcycle tractors allotted to the Kommando be fetched from the Depot at Nancy in Eastern France. Once the unit was reorganised on its new aerodrome, activity reports would be submitted as before. Another message from Schenck — which meant nothing to British Intelligence — advised that the "Czurusky task" had not come off and was now more urgent than before.

continued on next page …