Postponement

The traffic had so far not disclosed the date of the planned operation but at 0820 on 30 May a postponement was announced (it was two days before the Allies were able to read this signal). Meanwhile, two unspecified Gruppen were to be moved to Guise as soon as possible, in readiness for the operation. The same morning however, KG 77 confirmed to Fl.Kps. VIII that the transfer would take place as soon as the ground-mist cleared sufficiently. Nevertheless, the Geschwaderkommodore (Oberst Dr. Johann-Volkmar Fisser) was complaining that the Korps had provided him with no written orders for "Paula” and that he was often “left ignorant of plans in which he had to take part”.

Further details of the operation emerged on the 30th:

The start of “Operation P” from Sainte-Marie might be 55 minutes before zero [time on target?].

One of the bomber Geschwader participating was to fly in a column of three Gruppen over Sainte-Marie at 1500 m, with a Wackelflugzeug [literally “wobble plane"] flying 10 minutes ahead. Their course would take them south of Reims and their targets would be Corbeil, Melun and Nangis. After bombing, they would wheel south and return over Sedan. Time of take-off would be notified later.

III./ZG 76 would take part, weather permitting [confirmation followed just after midnight that it would indeed be available to escort KG 3].

Perhaps connected with the forthcoming operation, Fliegerkorps VIII was told at around 1930 on the 31st that it must have Staffeln of fighters at Denain-Rouvignies on 1100 hrs. on 2 June, ready to escort a Ju 52 of the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe.

On 1 June, it was announced (and the Allies knew by that evening) that KG 26 was to carry out an attack, meeting its escort from ZG 26 over Ste. Marie at 1300 but the day was not specified. The I./ZG 2 would also provide an escort as far as Creil and advance reconnaissance of both the weather and the target would be undertaken. That afternoon, KG 53’s Kommodore, Oberst Erich Stahl, asked to meet Jafü Luftflotte 3 regarding fighter escort for “Paula”; similarly, an officer of KG 1 was expected at Haynecourt (8 km NW of Cambrai) to confer with ZG 76, whose base this was, about the operation. Early that evening, Jafü 3 announced that he intended to hold one more conference before Operation “Paula” and that Kampfgeschwader (plural) were to telephone “L.S.Z. Neuenburg” to acknowledge some order. From a message possibly relating to the attack it was learned that KG 2 and ZG 2 were “shortly to make some move together”.

During the morning, Luftflotte 3 carried out a reconnaissance of the aerodromes Villeneuve-Orly, Vélizy-Villacoublay, Toussus-le-Noble, Beauvais, Dieppe-Saint-Aubin and Dieppe-Rouxmesnil. The first three of these were in the Paris area and in each case the condition of the field, its precise position and the aircraft present were reported.

In Fliegerkorps II, the operation was to be supported by four Ju 52 providing signals relay (e.g. between bombers and escorts). On 1 June Ltn. Belger’s aircraft was ordered to Wiesbaden to support JG 3, Ltn. Daniel’s to Trier (KG 2) and Obltn. Achsel’s to KG 77. Leutnant Noack (VB+PW, W.Nr. 6185) however was to receive special, verbal orders from the Korps’ Nachrichtenführer (Chief of Signals). On 30 May, “König” of Ju 52 DF+IE’s crew, which was with KG 26, asked for KG 30’s call signs “to assure communication”.

On 2 June, the servicing companies of 1./ZG 2, 2./ZG 1, and 5. and 7./ZG 26 were placed at the disposal of Fl.Kps. IV for PAULA; orders for their moves to operational airfields would come from Jafü 2. That evening at 2000, Jafü 3 told all Gruppen to be at readiness from 0700 next morning and to expect final orders by 0800. Confirmation was required that all Geschwader and Gruppen were clear about the details of the operation. Fighter escort would be in accordance with “Jafü Order No. 50” whose contents were not disclosed in the message. One detail that was included however was that II./JG 53 would set out from Laon-Couvron and refuel at the base of III./JG2 while a further message set out some units’ locations as of 2 June:

 

2.(F)/123

Couvron

 

 

JG 26

Pronville

wireless station

 

Stab JG 51 and I./JG 20

Saint Lyer

sic = Saint Lyé?

 

KG 28

Saint Léger

 

 

KG 53

Langendiebach

 

In addition, III./KG 76 was to to move to Cambrai as early as possible next morning, using it as a jumping-off airfield.

Attack

“Paula” finally took place on 3 June and an intercepted message describes one of the day’s bombing attacks, albeit not on Paris. III./KG 76’s assigned target was the aerodrome at Mory (S of Arras), with Crépy-en-Valois as the alternate. Nine aircraft took off from Cambrai at 1135, taking up a wedge formation. They flew at low level and the weather was perfect but they encountered rifle and machine gun fire throughout their flight, as well as anti-aircraft guns at Compičgne. Falling behind schedule, they attacked Noyon station, moving into a column formation and here again there was Flak. Dropping one SC 250 and 100 x SD 50 with delayed action fuses, they reported serious damage to the station. All the aircraft returned but eight of the nine were damaged by ground fire and the Kommandeur, Maj. Franz Reuss, was badly wounded. The following evening, III./KG 76 reported a strength of 31 aircraft, of which 20 were serviceable.

NOTE: Anyone seeking details of both sides’ losses is recommended to consult Peter Cornwell’s The Battle Of France, Then And Now.

On 6 July a report was issued, explaining that the crew of Oblt. Kapsch (9./KG 77) had made a forced landing near St. Omer with one man badly wounded, two slightly wounded and one unhurt. Feldwebel Patrzich’s (8./KG 77) also force landed near St. Omer and all on board were killed. Since Kapsch’s mishap is recorded by the Quartermaster General among the losses for 3 July along with an 8./KG 77 Do 17 Z missing from a flight to Aldershot, it is fairly clear that there was an error either at source or in Bletchley Park in dating these losses to 3 June.

The death registration card for Fw. Werner Patrzich dates this as 3 July, as does the German War Graves Association. He was initially reported as missing “3.7.40, 7 km S.Boulogne” with the time of “1500” added later. Subsequently, “missing” was struck through and “now dead … 10/7.40” added in red ink. His grave was “7 km S. Boulogne, 200 m SSO” (=south south east). Rather than being “near St. Omer” this is about 50 km away.

continued on next page…

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PART TWO OF FIVE

© Nick Beale 2017–2020


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